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ABSTRACT

Financial Innovation

by

Jose C. Blanco, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 1996

Major Professor: Dr. Christopher Fawson
Department: Economics
This dissertation was a study of the impact of financial innovation upon
financial institutions and some of the collateral macroeconomics effects.
Financial innovation has impacted the distribution of household assets
throughout the Group of Seven (G-7) countries and indirectly negatively
influenced the usage of traditional monetary aggregates as a reliable tool to
forecast the growth in the domestic money supply between 1960 and 1990.
The empirical results indicate that the adoption of financial innovations
by large U.S. commercial banks has not influenced their return on equity and
the return of assets between 1990 and 1994. The variability of the return on
equity and return on assets is reduced by those banks that have incorporated
financial innovations over time.

ill

The policy implications of these results indicate that sufficient market
instruments exist to assist banks to control interest rate exposure caused by
the volatility of interest rates and uncertain funding sources. Any intervention
by regulatory authorities could be welfare-decreasing for banks and possibly
increase the level of interest rates or reduce the supply of credit to prospective
borrowers.
(128 pages)
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CHAPTER!
TRODUCTION

The general emphasis of this dissertation is to review how financial
innovation may influence the economic behavior of firms and have collateral
macroeconomic effects. Financial innovation is defined as any new financial
product or service that emerges as a result of improved processing technology,
regulatory changes, and/or significant economic events.
Generally, innovations arising from technological developments are
considered endogenous to the process of financial institutions seeking
opportunities to offer more profitable banking and investment services to
customers. In essence, one observes the production possibilities frontier of
financial institutions being pushed outward.
Financial innovations that develop from regulatory actions or as a result
of significant economic events are considered exogenous. These exogenous
factors may manifest themselves in modifying the underlying utility for both
financial institutions and consumers. Financial innovations that are created
exogenously generally are a response to greater levels of risk and uncertainty
in capital markets.
The microeconomic effects are studied by reviewing how the top U.S .
banking institutions during the 1990s have introduced various types of
financial innovations. The levels and types of financial innovations are

2

analyzed to see the relative contribution these innovations may have made to
the return on equity and the return on assets.
The erosion of traditional bases of profitability in financial and
nonfinancial institutions in heretofore protected markets is a fundamental
reality underlying the drive to innovate around existing regulations, to develop
new financial products, and to exploit heretofore overlooked loopholes and
unevenness in the tax treatment of different types of income flows. This has
caused a greater tolerance for risk or asset-liability mismatches in seeking
higher yields. The increased pass-through of risk from issuers to investors, in
the opinion of some, has exacerbated the riskiness of the financial markets
(Carter 1989). This has prompted a second round of financial innovation due
to volatile interest rates, regulation, taxes, and technological advances which
has emerged from the risk management behavior of economic agents (Van
Horne 1985; Jordan 1995).
In economic theory, risk cannot be generally eliminated or minimized
but can be passed on to others. Financial innovation is considered to be viable

if markets become more efficient and complete.

For example, financial

derivatives are innovations that allow one to buy and sell risks in new ways.
The nature of derivative markets allows comparative advantages to evolve in
identifying and managing risks. 1
1
Financial derivatives arc ge nerally re ferred lO as the aggregate o f the swaps, futures,
a nd o ptio ns markets.
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Innovation that survives over time must reduce the deadweight
transaction cost and expand the reach of the market. The reduction of cost
generally entails the unbundling of various services, allowing each to be priced
and sold on its own merit. Successful cost-reducing strategies force competing
firms to adopt the innovation quickly , particularly when the elasticity of
demand is high . The driving force behind a cost-minimizing or cost-reducing
strategy is technological advancement (Dufey and Giddy 1981). Aside from the
traditional cost pressure on bank and brokerage fees, there is also a cost
associated with the gathering of information. Those costs that are rooted in
uncertainty- search and information- are generally the most difficult to
define (Baumol 1958).
The influence of transaction costs on the demand for money has been
instrumental in the determination of liquidity preference of economic agents.
According to Baumol (1958) and Hicks (1967, 1989), high transaction costs
make economic agents insensitive to changes in economic expectations and,
hence, contribute to the stability of capitalism. 2 Decreases in these costs are
likely to be a direct cause of the increasing fluctuations in security pricesa
The current view of financial transaction costs is that the reduction of costs

!}This alludes to the fact that economic agents wo uld not profit by undertaking a tra ding
upport umty if the cost of buying and se ll ing a securi ty exceeds the increase over the ori gina l
purc hase price
aTh c te rm "sec ur1ty '' prices is loose ly used Lo rcfCr to both equity a nd bond prices.
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has allowed financial markets to become more complete and efficient. The
reduction in trading and asset transfer costs has undoubtedly increased the
substitutability among liquid assets of similar risk characteristics.

This

substitution effect between assets has caused the traditional monetary
aggregates to move in ways unexplained by traditional macroeconomic
variables such as income and interest rates (Pierce 1984).
In the United States, the performance ofM1 and M2 became worse as
the variability of corporate and household cash flows changed when new
financial instruments appeared on the scene throughout the 1980s (Milbourne
1986). Financial liberalization in the 1980s has been identified as a
contributing factor in the poor pe1formance ofM4 in the U.K. (Spencer 1988).4
Financial innovation acts as a money supply shock that increases price
disturbances.5 If there is persistence in real aggregate money supply shocks
resulting from the changes in the real rate of interest, central banks will be
'"!"'he performance of a monetary aggregate like M I refers to how the variable ha s moved

in a predictable way. In other word s, if the central bank believes that M I a nd per so nal
co ns umption are closely related , then a "good" or "strong" pe rformance would be the
mainte nance of the relationship. M I is defined as the s um of all cash and curre ncy in the hand s
of the public. M2 is the sum of M I plus a ll demand and s hort· term deposits with depos itory
mstitutions. M3 is the s um of M I plus M2 plus money market funds a nd CD is greater than
100.000. M4 1s defined as M3 plus other liquid assets m the hands of the pubUc (bond a nd stock
fund s , ins ura nce policy cash values, etc.).
5
Financial in novations like securitization a nd the Eurodollar market arc innovations
created by financia l institutions. Sccurit1zat1o n is esse ntially the packagi ng of different classes
of assets in to s mg le-purpose vehicl es for sa le to institutional a nd private investors. This has
pr.rmittcd nonbank financia l institution s to become very large -sca le lenders. The Eurodollar
market has permitted non-U.S . resalent s to bcrrow US. dollars outside of the U.S . without th e
direct s up erv1s1on of the U.S . Federal Heserve Bank The E urodollar marke t represe nts U.S .
dollar deposits m non -U.S . banks outs1de the US Th ese deposits are then le nt at varying
~carmg ratJos , md1rcctly increasmg-thr US. money s upply
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able to forecast some portion of the changes in transaction requirements that
accompany these shocks and dampen the residual variation in prices by
accommodating these anticipated needs. Nondeposit transactions (repurchase
agreements, credit cards, derivatives, mutual funds, etc.) represent a supply
of financial instruments. This supply is not controlled by the central bank,
creating another way the economy may respond endogenously to fluctuating
transaction requirements associated with real shocks, thereby further
mitigating the price adjustment. Nondeposit transactions also alter the
economywide demand for currency and checkable bank deposit accounts,
causing prices of goods to adjust.

If

the rate of adoption of financial

innovations has a forecastable component, the central bank can smooth
expected prices by passively accommodating these innovations. As with
aggregate productivity shocks, this persistence may also enable the central
bank to dampen the disturbances to the current period's price level through
the impact of price expectations on real interest rates (Marquis and
Cunningham 1990).
The supply of financial innovations depends upon impulses from the
real sector. The innovation of money responds to a stimulus in the real sector
and, in turn, influences the potential path of real economic activity (Minsky
1957; Silber 1975)_s Investors generally seek hedges against future stochastic

&'J~h is 1dea s uggests that finan c1al innO\·auons arc spawned diffe re ntly, g ive n t.ha t the
nature of the changmg market condition s ma y be 1mpos mg new levels o f ri s k o n mdi v id ua Is a nd

firm s.
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shifts in the consumption and investment opportunity set. The development
of financial innovations acts as an inducement to the investor as some of the
financial risk is reduced by the unbundling of certain elements of project
related risk (i.e. , currency, interest rate, etc.), and this risk is sold off to
interested parties (Fama 1970).
Monetary innovations, as a subset of financial innovations, are
sometimes seen as a way of promoting real growth by circumventing
government regulations and restrictive monetary arrangements, which
constrain developments. This is consistent with a modern view of financial
evolution as a process of removing frictions and segmentation (Podolski 1986) 7
A general theory of financial innovation has been proposed by Silber
(1975, 1983), who approached the subject from the microeconomic viewpoint
of a financial institution. Financial institutions are assumed to maximize
utility subject to some balance sheet constraint; they are forced to innovate to
lessen or eliminate the financial constraints on the firms .
Financial firms are willing to undertake the cost of innovation when an
exogenous change in constraints takes place. Two examples of change are
related to modifications to the underlying constraint to which the financial
firm is subject.

7Scgme nta tio n refers to how ce rta in LYI>CS o f finan cial products a nd securities have a
very s pecific audience. This creates the problem that certa in security ty pes do not ea s ily pe rmit
most inv m;to r~ to be ne fit (rom a particul a r mvcs tm c nt o pportunity .
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The first is an exogenous change in the utility of the firm , and the firm
innovates in an effort to return to its previous level of utility. Needless to say,
financial firms may enhance their level of utility following the innovation if
new efficiencies are generated as a result of the innovative process. For
example, if those in a firm believe they must capture a larger market share or
diversify into other business areas, they would modify the underlying utility
of the firm , which may have been strictly profit maximization .
In the second case, innovation is a response to an increase in the cost of
adhering to a regulation, essentially causing an increase in the sh adow price
of the constraint. An example of this would be the creation of a new tax or
regulation that increased the cost of the firm's product. The firm would need
to innovate to increase the productivity of labor or capital, assuming that the
price of factor inputs remains unchanged, to maintain the same level of sales
and profitability.
In summary, Silber (1975) states that optimizing firms will innovate
when exogenous changes alter their constraints, and reoptimization will occur
with regard to the costs of developing innovations. The shortcoming of Silber's
analysis is the absence of any of the macroeconomic context dealing with the
emergence of new markets, new firms, or monetary standards (Podolski 1986).
Table 1 presents the influence of international financial markets and
product innovations on microeconomic and macroeconomic exogenous sources

8

TABLE 1
PRINCLPAL FINAN CIAL INNOVATI ONS

Types/Exogenous Causes•

MicroeconomJc

Money market mutual funds
Cash ma nage ment/sweep acct.

Macroeconomic

.f(la)
.f (3)

NOW acco unts

.f(la)
.f( la)

Automatic te ller machines

.f (3)

Zero co upon bonds

.f (Ic)

Bonds w/put options & warrants

.f ( lc)

.f(Ia)
.f( I a)(2)

.f(5)

Eurocurrency bond s

.f(5)

Foreign c urrency futures

Option s o n futures

.f(4)

I RA!Keogh accounts

.rI c)

Stnppcd bo nd s

.f( I a)( I b)(2)

I ntcrest rate futures

.f(2)
.f(2)

Floating rate notes
Exchanges traded options

.f (6)

E lectro ni c trading

.f (3)

Discount trading

.f (3)(4)

Intcrstatc banktn g

.f (3)(4)

New types of finan cia l institutions

& organization

.f(6)

.f(J)(2)

*'rho numbers in parentheses represent the specific exogenous ca uses of the financial

1nnovation: ( I) mOatio n: (Ia) level of interest rates, ( I b) general price leve l, ( lc) tax e ffects;
(2) volatility of interest rates; (3) technology; (4) legislative initiative; (5)

~lobalization

financtal ma rkets; and (6) c hanges in th e market structure of financial services firms .

of

9
of innovation . The contents of the table come from publications generated by
Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith (1992), SG Warburg (1990), Bank of England
(1991) , and Federal Reserve Bank (1995). The categorization of financial
innovations into microeconomic (Silber 1975) and macroeconomic effects (Van
Horne 1984; Chen, Roll, and Ross 1986) is an important distinction in
researchin g the theoretical causes of financial innovation.
The phenomenon of financial innovation has also been characteristic of
nonfinancial institutions. Changes in the financial sector8 have induced
nonfinancial firms and the largest industrial producers to become active
participants in the financial markets due to shrinking returns generated in
manufacturing and production for the last 20 years. Figure 1 illustrates the
evolution of the nonfinancial (NFI/P%) and financial (FliP%) income 9 with
respect to nonfinancial corporate profits (Niggle 1986).
The literature shows different combinations of state variables that can
be useful in the prediction of returns on securities or gross national product
(GNP) . Table 2 is a breakdown of some empirical research connecting the level
of macroeconomic activity to financial markets.

8 Th is

re fers to new types of finan cialmto rmediaries, financial products a nd se rvices,

a nd fin a ncial asset s.

nF'inancial income is defin ed a s th e s um of mtercst, royalties, ca pital gain s, a nd
divul c nd s rece ived by nonfinancial corporatio ns . No ninte rest finan cial inco me is fi nancial
tnco mo less interest.
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President, 1990 (Table B-12) and 1993 (Table B-14).

In a Lucas-type economy (Lucas 1978), a higher level of expected future
production leads to both a higher expected market return and market
premium. The expected market premium is also increasing in the conditional
volatility of production growth. In most general equilibrium models of asset
pricing with production, prices of financial assets depend on the conditional
production volatility.
According to Chen (1991), a perusal of the theoretical literature
motivates the hypotheses relating market premium to certain stylized facts of

11

TABLE 2
EMPffilCAL RESEARCH LINKING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE MA CRO ECONOMY

State Variable/Model
Risk premium*
Term premium**
Short-term interest
rates
Lagged production
growth
Change in aggregate
production
Dividend yield
Dividend price ratio
Inflation
Expected inflation
Lagged stock price ratio
Predicted Values:
Change in GNP
Return on secu rities

Chen 1991

Chen, Roll,
and Ross 1986

,/

,/
,/

,/

,/

,/

Pama a nd
French 1990

,/

,/
,/

,/
,/

,/
,/
,/

,/
,/

,/

*Represents the interest clifferential between low-grade and high-grade bonds.
**Represents the interest rate differential between the short-term and
long-term government bonds.

the macroeconomy within the context of a Lucas-type economy (Lucas 1978):
1.

The risk aversion implicit in the pricing of financial securities and,
hence, the expected market premium are negatively correlated with a
measure of the relative health of the economy, such as the recent growth
of the aggregate economy.

12
2.

Since financial securities are claims against future outputs, a measure
of the future productivity of capital, such as the expected growth rate of
the aggregate economy, should be positively correlated with the
expected market return and premium.

3.

The expected market premium is positively related to a measure of the
conditional uncertainty of the production technology.
In an intertemporal market equilibrium, the state variables that are

priced are those that can forecast changes in the investment and consumption
opportunity set. In Chen (1991), the state variables that were positively
(negatively) related to the recent growth of the economy are negatively
(positively) related to the expected excess market return, and state variables
that are positively (negatively) related to the future growth rates of the
economy are positively (negatively) related to the expected excess market
return.
This allows one to interpret the ability of state variables to forecast
market returns in terms of their correlations with changes in the macroeconomic environment.
One of the macroeconomic variables that is common to all the models
discussed is the short-term interest rate. The short-term interest rate is the
common metric that establishes the cost of funds for both financial and
nonfinancial institutions for either borrowing or extendin g credit terms to

13
customers. The short-term rates of interests in the economy (Fed Funds,
REPOs , T-Bills, etc.) are, in good part, subject to the Federal Reserve Bank's
position on interest rates and inflation, which are transmitted through open
market operations and the discount rate. 10

An increase in the discount rate forces banks to charge more for loans,
hence slowing the level of borrowing and dampening investment demand. A
slowdown in the levels of investment slows the growth of producer demand for
all inputs- labor and capital. This slowdown in turn causes real wages to
stagnate or even drop, causing consumption to be reduced and initiating a fall
in aggregate demand (Dornbusch and Fischer 1994).
Understanding the importance of the fluctuating value of financial
assets on the macroeconomy provides a linkage to the role of monetary policy
in stimulating financial innovation. The level and volatility of interest rates
have generated certain types of financial innovations (see table 1), which can
act as impulses upon the money supply.

l<>r'ho discount rate is the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve Bank to me mbe r
banks that borrow (rom it to meet temporary rese rve needs.
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CHAPTER II
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION

The U.S. banking industry has evolved significantly during the 1980s.
However, the financial innovation evolutionary process follows a unique path
with commonalities between the principal developed countries.

Table 3

presents a summary of the key economic variables across the Group of Seven
(G-7) countries.

A visual inspection provides the reader with a useful

understanding of how different each country's financial markets are relative
to each other.
The selected group of countries and time period have both economic and
historical connotations. The four European countries were colonial powers, to
varying degrees, for several centuries. The quasi-mercantilism they practiced
came to an abrupt halt in the 1950s and 1960s.
As the decolonialization process evolved, nations worldwide utilized

various policies to stimulate growth and development. Selected European
countries, Japan, and the United States all became members of the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in 1959
and 1960 as many transnational organizations like the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to take hold.
The financial markets in the G-7 countries had varying degrees of
importance. One must recall that the Keynesian revolution was at its hiatus.

15
TABLE 3
RELATIVE E CO NOMI C COMI'A){ISON O J' THE

Category

United
States

Japan

G-7 COUNTRIES (1993)

Co untr
United
Germa ny Kingdom France

262
81
Population (in mil.)
125
.35
.3 1
27
Marke t cap/GNP*
.40
. 14
04
Mutual fund /G NP
I 55(e)
Bond market/G NP**
90
85
.33
. 17
07
Pe nsiOn reserves/GNP
21%
56%
58%
Trade dependency 1
Foreign bank profit
share:
0.05
NA
NA

Italy

Canada

58
.75
. II
69
.51
35%

57
.22
.30
87
.07
30%

57
. 12
.06
I 65(e)
02
38%

23
32
17
1.20(e)

.22(e)

. 16(e)

NA

NA

.25

40%

SOUl!CES: Morgan Stanley Cap ital Inte rnational 1995; Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith
1992; Bank of England 1991; Bank of Ca nada 1994 ; Bank of France 1994; Dankoflta ly 1995;
Marsh 1992; McLean 1993; OECD 1994; OECD 1986 anti 199 I; and author's own estimates (o) .
*Represents the total stock market capitalization relative to GNP.
**The Italian lira bond market is dominated by government borrowing, including both
federal and loca l municipalities. Over 85 perce nt of the outstanding balance of debt issues
a rc governme nt-sponsored or guaranteed .
tRepresents the sum of a country's imports and exports as a percentage of GNP.
~Inc share that foreign banks represent of total domestic commercial bank profits afte r
lax

NA = not available.

Government and, to a certain extent, business believed that production and
particular areas of finance could be organized more efficiently at the state level
than at the individual level.
This led to the nationalization or the heavy regulation of a large
percentage of the industrial base, particularly in the automobile, energy,
telecommunications, mining, and airline industries. The financial sector also
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came under scrutiny in countries like France, where the four largest banks
were nationalized in 1981. 11
In the U.S., the role of depositary institutions has been to handle market
imperfections. Market imperfections are defined by the existence of varying
transaction costs for indivisible assets.
The period between 1960 and 1990 has been marked primarily by a shift
of household assets away from traditional depositary institutions and time
deposits to other investment vehicles as the level of substitutability increased.
Substitutability improved as transaction costs diminished, access to
different asset classes existed, better information became available, and
markets became less deregulated.
Table 4 highlights the distribution of U.S. household financial assets
over time. The principal conclusion is that tax-favored vehicles like pension
funds and mutual funds were the asset classes of choice. 12 The traditional
vehicles that historically have composed household investment-corporate
equities, bonds, and bank deposits- have dropped substantially.
The composition of the British personal sector is somewhat different but
yet similar when it comes to a large percentage being allocated to life

11
1n t he U.K. and Ca nada, banks were required to invest up to 50 pe rce nt in
government-rela ted instruments or loans to subsidize the s tate's budgetary needs. [n German y,
ba nks we re required to maintain very high levels of liquidity and worked closely with t he
govern me nt. to invest in strategic business areas.

12
Since 1990, share holders of mutua l fund s are required to pay taxes on all capital gai n s
ea rned during each tax yea r.
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TABLE 4
COMPOSITION OF H OUSE HOLD FINANCIAL AsSETS IN THE U.S. (PERCENT)

Ca tegory

1960

1970

d
1980

1990

Total d eposits*
Total government securities* *
Total Credit Market Instrumentst
Corporate Equities
Investme nt Related Mutual Funds1
Money Market Mutual Fund Shares
Pension Fund Reserves
Life Insurance Reserves
Pension and Mutual Fund Assets as
a% of Household Financial Assets

17.5
6. 1
5.4
26.8
0
6.3
6.6

20.6
4.0
5.2
28.8
1.8
0
9.4
5.3

25.4
3.0
4.4
14.3
0.8
0.4
14. 1
4.3

21.71
3.3
6.0
12.8
3. 1
2.5
23.5
2.6

12.9

16.5

19.3

3 1.7

e

1.1

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board 1994.
*Total deposits = checkable deposits and currency plus small time and savings deposits
plus large deposits.
**Total U.S . government securities = savi ngs bonds plus other Treasury issues plus
agency issues.
tTotal credit market instrume nts= tax-exempt plus corporate and fore ign bonds plu s
ope n-ma rket paper.
trnvest.me nt-re lated mutual fund s are eq uity, bond, and income mutual fund s.

insurance companies and pension funds. 13 Table 5 illustrates the distribution
of the U.K. personal sector from 1970-90. To make an adequate comparison
of tables 4 and 5, certain categories must be combined or certain items deleted.
The percentages in tables 4 and 5 do not add to 100 since real assets, security
credit, and miscellaneous assets are excluded.

13 U.S. life insurance companies lost a sha re of household financial assets while Britis h
insurers increased. This has been attributed to the fact that U.S . insurers we re s low to provide
competitive returns to policyholde rs while portfolio managers at British insurers wcro mord
innovative and invested heavily in U.K. equities and real estate.
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TABLE 5

U.K.

P ERSONAL S ECTOR: S ELECT ED FINANC IAL AsSET STOC KS ( PE RCE NT)

Period
Ca tegory

19 70

1980

1990

Ste rlin g M 3
Na tiona l savings
Buudin g socie ties
U.K. co mpa ny secunlles
Um t t rus t umts
Equ1ty in life insura nce a nd
pe n swn fund s
Ove r cas assets

14.2
5. 1
16.5
16.5
I I

15. 2
4. 1
16.7
13.5
I

11.6
4.9
16 .2
13
1. 5

29.6
1. 2

33.6
1. 2

40.7
1.5

SOURCE: BankofEngland 1991.

It is difficult again to draw strong conclusions from table 4 concerning

the level of substitutability between asset classes. The category entitled
''Equity in life insurance and pension reserves" saw a substantial jump relative
to the category entitled "U .K. company securities." However, equity-related
investment vehicles like life insurance and pension reserves enjoy attractive
tax benefits compared to direct investment in corporate securities. In some
ways, no clear trend is shown because the tax benefit essentially is a
government subsidy that acts as a natural attractor for personal savings at the
margin.
The overseas sector has a particularly important role in the U. K.
financial system. The banking system is of primary relevance to the overseas
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sector in terms of provision of funds to U.K. financial intermediaries, and, in
this respect, foreign currency transactions dominate (Curwen 1987).
The French and Italian (the Latin nation-states in the G-7) markets
have evolved very differently. The principal focus of household financial assets
has been capital preservation as opposed to financial returns. Historically,
both countries' capital markets have been very volatile, unstable, and
considered by the public as money losers.
The household sector in France has, on average, accounted for more
than 40 percent of total gross savings over the past 30 years and has been the
most important source of new capital for industry. The problem is that only
a very small proportion of these funds is in a form that industry can use
directly, as most private savings are in cash or short-term deposits with banks
and savings institutions. The French government over the years has granted
certain liquid savings a more attractive tax treatment than other long-term
investments.
The figures in table 6 highlight this- in 1970, only 2 percent of
household savings is allocated to long-term savings vehicles like life insurance,
pensions, and corporate securities.
Institutional investors (i.e. , insurers, pension funds , and fund
mana gers) in the 1960s and 1970s were heavily regulated and relatively minor
players in the capital markets. Life insurers in France were required to invest
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TABLE 6
COMPOSI TION OF FR ENCH H OUSE HOLDS' H OLDTNGS IN FINANC IAL
AsSr;TS (P ERCENT)

Catego ry

1960

1970

Period
1980

1990

Fra nc l'v1 3
Eq uity in lifo ins urance and
pension reserves
Mu t ua l fund s
All sccunties
Othe r asse ts

37.0

39 0

44 .0

35.0

2.0
0
7.0
20.0

2.0
0
20
24 .0

3.0
2.0
3.0
20.0

SOURCE:

7.0
15 0

5.0
17.0

Rapport sur les Co mptes de Ia Nation, 197 1; Bank of Prance 1994, a nd OECD

1994 .

at least 50 percent of their technical reserves in the currency of the risks they
cover to obviate the exchange risk.
In the early 1980s, French authorities gave insurers more flexibility in
investing their reserves. Currently, there are no statutory percentage
requirements concerning the asset class or currency but, rather, regulators
focus on the coherency of the insurer's investment policy. 14
In 1970, French fund managers were required to hold 90 percent of their
portfolios in quoted securities with no more than 5 percent in any one
company. In addition, 30 percent of their investment must be in bonds or

11

A sse t· li a bili t~·

management has beco me a common buzzword for insurance regulators

w11h in the EEC lO assure the mselv es that lntcrcs t·sc ns itivc liabilities arc ade qua te ly covc rC'cl .
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liquid assets. Their role in the overall capitalization of the Paris Bourse barely
approached 4 percent (Readman et a!. 1977).
The genesis of financial innovation in modern times began in the 1960s
as the credit and depository markets became international. The major event
was the establishment of the Eurodollar market despite tighter currency
controls in the U.K. In 1968, Office of Financial and Depository Institutions
(OFDI) regulations forced U.S. investment banks and corporations to
undertake numerous new bond issues. 15
During the 1950s and 1960s, European borrowers turned to New York
to obtain funds , borrowing and selling their dollars to banks, which often
added them to the banks' reserves. This caused a "deficit" for the U.S.
government, according to the liquidity definition of equilibrium, in the balance
of payments used by the government.
The principal owners were European investors who accepted a lower
yield than that available in other countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland, presumably in exchange for a more liquid asset with a
broader secondary market and, therefore, a better likelihood of being converted
into cash without a sharp price decline. These three countries maintained
interest rates below those of other European countries by limiting access of

15 The OFDI was within t he U.S. Depa rtme nt of Treasury. It ha d broa d power s t.o
supe rv ise the complia nce of banking in stitutions to laws legisla ted by Co ngress. The Federa l
Depositors Insura nce Co mpany (FDI C) a nd t he Federa l Reserve Bank focused more upon t he
fi na ncia l solve ncy of ba nking institutions tha n on legal complia nce.
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foreign borrowers to their capital markets. The maintenance of low interest
rates permitted the domestic government to borrow at the low rates.
U.S. authorities were critical of the European government stating that
they were riddled with a monopoly that diverted borrowers to New York. With
competition, American bankers believed that if Europeans would borrow in
Europe, the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments would be relieved.
The European view of the problem is that Europe and the U.S. had
different preferences for liquidity. So Europeans borrowed long and lent short
to gain the liquidity needed in Europe and available in the U.S. (Kindleberger

1965, 1984).
However, research showed that the European credit markets
discriminated in favor of domestic borrowers, especially national governments,
and against foreign borrowers, particularly in regulations governing the
investment funds from savings banks, insurance companies, etc. (European
Commission 1967, p. 15).
The political and regulatory environments contributed to the
development of the Eurodollar market as well. Investors of dollar deposits in
European banks could escape Regulation Q and obtain marginally higher rates
of return on their money.

Secondly , certain types of major financial

institutions (i.e., the Russian State Bank) could safely deposit their funds in
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dollars outside the U.S. where the chances of their being affected by political
incident were reduced.
The economics of the Eurodollar market and its influence on U.S .
monetary policy generated substantial debate. Some argued that the shift of
a dollar deposit to a European bank (or European branch of an American
bank) could be regarded as an increase in reserves in the Eurodollar market,
which then could be loaned and reloaned to borrowers who could put the
money back into the system or pay it to people who could do so. This could
expand the money supply in multiple fashion and could be comparable to an
increase in the primary reserves of a national banking system (Friedman 1969,
1970).
The process could be cut off if the original borrower spent the dollars in
the United States so that they could not be redeposited in the Eurocurrency
market. In this case, the possibilities of multiple expansion exist, where the
recipient of the borrowed funds generally does not return them to the savings
and loan system and the same dollar is saved and relent outside the United
States (Klopstock 1968, pp. 3-9).
Klopstock's view held in the early stages as dollars were borrowed by
those entities that wanted to spend in dollars.

However, as the market

evolved, dollars were borrowed for stockpiling needs or by Europeans who did
not want to be short of dollars, and then sold to a central bank against local
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funds.

When the central bank redeposited the dollars in th e Eurodollar

market , a basis was laid for relending and multiple expansion.
The Eurobond market was developed for similar reasons because of
onerous registration requirements by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and also in part due to the Interest Equalization Tax (lET) imposed by
the U.S. in 1963 on bond interest to stop European countries from borrowing
in the U.S . 16
U.S. banks were forced to develop new products to compensate for the
erosion of their depositor base further stimulated by the volatile interest rate
environment of the 1980s and the increased globalization of financial markets.
The most widely used by U.S. banks is the swap product. The first
currency swap was engineered in London in 1979. 17 During the following two
years, the swap market remained undeveloped. In 1981, Salomon Brothers
put together what is now the landmark currency swap involving the World
Bank and IBM. In the same year the first interest rate swap took place in
London. Later in the U.S., the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie
Mae) employed a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap to convert the
interest-rate character of some of its liabilities.

"'rhe I ET was a tax levied upon fore1gn borrowers, primarily E uropea n, based on th e
differe ntial between the U.S . and the foreign borrower's domestic interest rate.
17 London controls over 30 percent of the world's fore ign exchange ma rket w ith New Yo rk
being second . Nonethe less, U.S . banks have had a very visible presence in t he London market
thro ugh branch offices or subsidia ri es.
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Once established, the market for currency and interest rate swaps grew
rapidly. From under $5 billion in combined notional principal outstanding at
the end of 1982, the market grew to over $3.5 trillion by the end of 1993.
Initially U.S. banks acted in the role of brokers. That is, they would find
potential counterparties with matched needs and, for a commission, would
assist the parties in the negotiation of a swap agreement. Soon afterward,
many of the major banks began to operate as dealers and played the role of a
counterparty. This was possible because of the existence of a large cash
market for the U.S. Treasury debt and well-developed futures markets in
which the swap dealers could hedge their resultant exposures.
Commodity swaps were first introduced in 1986 by Chase Manhattan
Bank but did not flourish until the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFI'C) issued a favorable ruling in 1989 granting the "safe harbor," provided
that certain criteria were met. By the end of 1989, the volume of commodity
swaps outstanding was nearly $8 billion.
The futures markets, particularly financial futures , emerged from
obscurity in the 1970s. The world's principal futures and options market is the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CMC) followed by the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE).

Both markets have

developed futures for a variety of fixed income instruments in most of the
principal currencies and offer stock market index futures for S&P stock index
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and the FT-SE. Financial futures differ from commodity futures in several
ways. Probably the most important is that many financial futures are not
deliverable in the traditional sense. The delivery process associated with
commodity futures restricts the actual delivery to a narrow delivery period.
Within the bounds of the delivery period, the actual time of delivery is left to
the discretion of the short, or the lender of the security. This suggests that the
short will notify the clearing association that delivery will be made. The long
(the purchaser) makes payment and the short turns over warehouse receipts
that evidence ownership of the stored commodity.
The last major product area that developed were put and call options.
Until the mid-1970s, puts and calls were traded over-the-counter. In 1975, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was established. Since then, the
organized trading of options increased significantly where today options are
traded on individual stocks, on stock indexes, and on futures contracts
(Marshall and Bansal 1992).
The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) was the final big
change in western financial markets, particularly among the selected group of
countries.

Two powerful forces moved the drive to European monetary

unification: (1) continuation of the integration movement in its various
aspects-commercial, economic, financial, and, possibly, political; and
(2) growing weakness of the dollar as a world currency.
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The EMS came into being in 1978, replacing the old snake system. 18 All
the EEC members, except the United Kingdom, participated in the new EMS
structure. The EMS offered more specific guidelines for central bankers. The
new system provides two major types of central bank interventions to
maximize exchange rate stability among EEC currencies. The first type of
intervention is compulsory and enters into effect whenever the exchange rate
between a pair of participating currencies departs by more than 2.25 percent
from the official parity rate of one currency in terms of the other. 19
The second type ofintramargin central bank intervention is based on a
new criterion, the "divergence indicator." Under the terms of the EMS, the
central bank of an EEC country is "presumed to act" whenever the "divergence
indicator" for its currency crosses the "divergence threshold." 20
The implications of the EMS were evaluated in the Cecchini Report of
1988, which stated that the establishment of a single and free European
1
"'f'h c "snake" was a conti nuation of the old Smithsonian ag reement of March 1972, by
which exchange rate (]uctuations between any two EEC currencies were restricted . The
objective was to establish narrower fluctua tion bands of 2.25 percent. The first cri sis occurred
in July 1972, where expectations of high inflation and a growing balance-of- payments deficit
provoked a llight from t he pound, forci ng the Bank of England to withdraw from the s nake.

19 An exception was made in the case of the Italian lira; the Italian currency was
ex plicitly aUowed to fluctuate within margins of 6 percent around its centra l rate.
110The

"divergence indicator'' is calculated by the following formula :
(I) P or D = ECU market - ECU ce ntral!ECU central x 100
(2) Dr = P or DIMDS x 100

where P = premium, D = discount, Dl = dive rgence indicator, and MDS = maximum diverge nce
spread .
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market will boost intra-EEC investment and sharpen business competition
within the community area. Increased competition will lower costs and prices.

The disappearance of frontier controls on the cross/border movement of goods
will cause an immediate fall in goods' prices as the costs of their distribution

decline. The report estimated that the single European market would raise the
community's annual rate of economic growth by 5 percent, would cause prices
to fall by 6 percent, and would improve external balances by 1 percent. In
addition, the report predicted that, as a consequence of its formation , the
single market would create 1.8 million jobs (Lieberman 1992).
In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty was enacted, whereby the EMS would
enter its final phase of convergence toward a common currency. The treaty
imposed further requirements upon EEC countries to bring their domestic
budget deficits and inflation in line. The treaty requires that, in order for a
country to participate in the new EMS scheduled for 1998, budgetary deficits
cannot exceed 3 percent.2 1 Recently, the European union gave the proposed
single currency a name-the Euro--and reiterated that monetary union would
begin on January 1, 1999.
Figure 2 illustrates the current level of inflation and budget deficits of
the selected European countries relative to the Maastricht 3 percent objective.

21
Th e Maastricht Treaty included the 12 EEC coun t ries-Prance, United Kingdom,
Ge rmany, Netherla nds, Luxe mbourg, Belgium, ltaly, Ire land , Greece, De nma rk, Spain, and
Portugal. In 1994, three new countries entered the EEC a nd have committed to co mplying with
the trea ty-Swede n, Finland, a nd Au stria .
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The more advanced economies- Germany, Britain, and France-appear to be
closer to achieving the specified inflationary and budgetary objectives, while
Italy struggles with excessively generous social programs and large
deficit-ridden government services- railroads, airlines, postal services, etc.
The response by commercial banks within the G-7 countries to
increasing competition and financial innovation has varied. Figure 3 presents
a comparison of the return on equity and tier 1 capital ratio of the major banks
of the four European G-7 member countries and the U.S. The graph indicates
that the U.K. and U.S. banking institutions have fared well and have
successfully diversified into other financial products that are not lending
based, but fee based. Also, European banks have been slow to implement new
processing technologies to reduce the unit cost of financial transactions. This
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has caused European banks to earn half of what their U.S. counterparts do,
with the exception of the U.K. banks.
As a result, the declining levels of profitability will cause banking
institutions in these countries to have diminished clout in the EEC and
international financial circles. Evidence of this has already appeared as no
French or Italian bank was a candidate to acquire Barings, SG Warburg, or
Klein wort Benson (Calian, Steinmetz, and Sesit 1996).22

22 These three British merchan t banks w ere recently acquired by Dutch, Swi ss, and
German banks when they had severe fin ancial troubles or we re made lucrative purchase offers
in the la st t hree yea rs.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION

The evolution of financial innovation as stated earlier has both
microeconomic and macroeconomic effects. The microeconomic effects have
surfaced by changing the underlying economic incentives of the banking
system . U.S. banks that once relied on a stable supply of customer deposits
and a steady demand for credit have seen their funding sources change
substantially and face more competition for qualified borrowers.
In the U.S. , banks have reacted in response to financial reform, which
has come from different directions. Events such as the problems of the thrift
industry, lesser developed countries (LDC) debt, increased bank failures, and
the recent stock market crash have caused concern.23 More subtle, perhaps,
but no less important are longer term trends, such as the erosion of traditional
roles of financial institutions, development of new and esoteric types of
financial instruments, and the globalization of world financial markets.
Financial innovation, according to most Federal Reserve authorities, is
one of the principal reasons that market imperfections are breaking down ,
modifying the raison d'etre for the existence of depositary institutions. The

.,l'he ra te of bank failures in 1986 a nd 1987 was at a n all-time high except for the 1920s
a nd 1930s. The writeo ffs of third-world debt for the 1980s r eached over U.S .S50 billion . Th e
tra din g losses due to the 1987 stock market crash a nd the 1989 stock marke t me ltdown we re
virt ua lly incalcula ble.
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traditional role of banks has been to collect deposits from the public in varied
amounts and then lend these funds to individuals and corporations. The
depositary institution essentially corrects the market imperfection by bridging
the gap between savers and lenders (Greenbaum and Thakor 1995).
The traditional argument that banks are special rests on: (1) the role
that banks play as sources of liquidity, (2) the importance of bank liabilities
as money, and (3) the inherent liquidity problem banks face because certain
bank liabilities are redeemable at par on very short notice whereas their assets
are not.

These roles have changed as technologically driven financial

innovations have modified the role of traditional deposit taking.
The liabilities that serve the function of money, demand deposits and
short-term time deposits, have increased. Checks are routinely written on
savings (NOW) accounts at both banks and savings and loans (S&Ls), and
mutual savings banks offer checking accounts, and credit unions offer share
drafts. Debit cards are the equivalent of a check. Through the use of computer
technology, debit cards reduce float for the issuing institution, which now must
be paid for if the Federal Reserve paper check-clearing services are used.
More important than these new substitutes for demand deposit
payments are methods that evolved to reduce the need for large dollar balance
holders to hold funds in transaction accounts. A host of cash management
devices, such as zero balance accounts, deposit scanning, and lockbox
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arrangements, are employed to collect funds that would otherwise be held in
th e form of idle balances and channel them into instruments yielding a
positive rate of return. As a result, most large and increasingly small dollar
depositors have benefitted from the ease and reduced costs of converting
interest-bearing financial assets into demand deposits, indicating that the
traditional function of money balances as a source of liquidity has become less
and less unique or important (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1987).
Market developments have eroded commercial bank advantages over the
direct credit markets. Bank liabilities no longer perform a unique function in
the banking system.
The evolution of the innovations that changed the relative share of the
banking system among total financial intermediary assets between 1960 and
1990 in the

U.S.

is shown in table 7.
TABLE 7

U .S . RELATIVE SHARES OF TOTAL FINANCIAL lNTERMEDlARY AsSETS,

1960-90

Fina ncia l Intermediary

1960

1970

1980

1990

Commercial banks

38.6
20. 1
2'1.0
9.8

38.5
20.8
19. 1
13 0
:l 7
3. 7

37 .2
23.3
17.4
13.0
3.7
5.3

26 .8
16.0
19. 1
19 3
10 9
79

Thrifts
I nsura nee co mpa mcs
Penston and tru st
I nvcstm cnt co mpanies
Fmancc companies

S Ot ' RCE:

2.9

1.7

Fe de ral Reserve Board 1960- 1990.
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A second microeconomic effect, and the focus of this dissertation's
research, is the proliferation of new financial products. The advent of interest
rate swaps, futures/options, and foreign exchange trading have changed the
strategic business direction of many of the largest U.S. banks. The "new"
products adopted by bankers have grown in demand as corporations and
nonbank financial institutions have sought new ways to manage risk.
The new product innovations introduced by banks have attempted to
make markets more complete and efficient. Below is a brief explanation of
these product innovations and their role in modern finance.

A. Interest Rate Swaps
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange

a series of interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt. In a
classic swap transaction, fixed-for-floating rate swap, one party promises to
pay the counterparty at designated intervals an amount of interest calculated
at a fixed rate on a given principal amount (called the notional value of the
swap); the counterparty promises to pay at the same intervals a variable rate
of interest on the same principal calculated according to a floating-rate index.
A single amount is transferred at each payment date to cover the net difference
in the interest payments instead of exchanging the gross interest payments
(Kim and Koppenhaver 1992).
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The use of swaps by U.S. banks has been attributed to attempts to
complement or substitute for other off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities. The
literature cites three main justifications for the existence of interest rate swap
markets: reduces debt issuance costs, helps complete the set of financial
markets available to traders, and helps complete the set of financial markets
available in taxation and regulation across different debt markets.
Bricksler and Chen (1986) reason that the benefits from an interest rate
swap are the comparative funding cost advantage between borrowers; a firm
\vith a low credit rating can effectively lower its fixed-rate financing costs by
borrowing short-term, floating-rate funds , and swappin g the interest with a
high-rated company, instead of issuing corporate bonds. The reduction in
financing cost is possible because the quality spread in the short-term,
floating-rate market is typically narrower for the low-rated firm than in the
long-term, fixed-rate market.

Bricksler and Chen suggest differential

information among investors and institutional restrictions as two possible
sources of market imperfections and the comparative funding cost advantage
among different borrowers.
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986) argue that interest rate swaps
can be characterized as a series of forward contracts and complete the set of
financial markets available to traders. Sometimes credit markets to certain
types of borrowers are illiquid with long-dated forward markets in debt
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securities.

They continue by stating that swaps can contribute to the

integration of financial markets by allowing market participants to fill gaps
left by inactive or incomplete markets. Interest rate swaps can also be used to
create new financial instruments. For example, the combination of fixed-rate
loan and an interest rate swap, in which the borrower makes fixed-rate
payments, produces a reverse floating-rate loan; if interest rates rise, the net
interest payments on the loan fall.
The size of the interest rate swap market by the end of 1994 reached a
notional value of $4 trillion dollars. Interest rate swaps represent about 30
percent of the financial derivatives market and over 60 percent of derivatives
related to interest rates

B . Interest Rate Futures and Options
A future trading position captures a bank's experience with related
off-balance sheet activities that can be used to manage interest rate risk.
Futures also test for any complementarities between exchange-traded and
over-the-counter interest rate risk management instruments. For example, a
bank that provides swap market intermediary services makes a market in
interest rate swaps to accommodate the needs of its customers. Matching or
offsetting swap contracts may not be offered to the swap broker at the same
time, in which case the bank is exposed to interest rate risk as the swap
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counterparty. Unmatched interest rate swaps can be temporarily hedged with
a strip or interest rate future contract.
Interest rate options represent a right, not an obligation, to buy or sell
a fixed income security at a fixed price sometime in the future or upon some
contractual arrangement. Many variations exist-options on options and
options on interest rate swap transactions (Gartland, Nicholas, and Fabozzi
1996).
The size of the interest-rate futures and forwards contracts at the end
of 1994 represented $3.2 trillion while the volume of interest rate options
reached $1.8 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 1995).

C. Asset Securitization
According to Blanco and Fawson (forthcoming), asset securitization
simply stated is the practice of financial intermediaries originating loans and
using financial markets to seek investors who are willing to hold a portfolio of
packaged securitized assets. The advent of securitization has transformed
traditional corporate and mortage lending in the last 20 years.
The growth in mortgage lendin g has been attributed to the growth in
securitization since loan demand is no longer constrained by bank balance
sheet limitations, but rather by the relationship between the yield curve and
the reservation rate of interest paid by borrowers for mortgages.
The volume of all securitized assets was approximately $3 trillion at the
end of 1993.
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The principal macroeconomic implication has been the changing informational content of the attempts by central banks in the G-7 group to control
monetary aggregates. 24 The discount rate has had a different level of economic
influence across countries. Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy (1994) reviewed the
impact of changes in the central bank discount rates across a number of OECD
countries and measured the subsequent changes in equity, bond, and money
market prices. The influence upon capital markets can help determine the
relative influence the central bank may have on the economy.
A strong relationship between the discount rate and the direction of
asset prices (wheth er positive or negative) should indicate a high level of
influence of the central bank on financial markets.
A second implication of the Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy study is that a
high degree of sensitivity between the discount rate and capital markets can
be considered a measure of sophistication of each country's financial system .
A concern in interpreting table 8 too literally is understanding the true role of
the discount rate within each country's monetary policy. In the United States,
all capital markets were strongly influenced by the discount rate.
The results were mixed for the other selected countries where
institutional investors, primarily commercial banks, insurance companies, and
fund managers, were required to hold a certain portion of the reserves or funds
2"Thc three tools commonly cons idered available LO central banke rs to control th e mo ney
supply a rc open marke l opcration s, th e rcscrv<' reqUire me nt, and 1h e di scount rate .
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TABLE 8
IMPA CT OF CH.<\NGES IN THE CENTRAL BANK DISCOUNT RATE UPON
FINANCIALMARKETS, 1960-89

Asset Class

Country

United States
Japan
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Italy
Canada

Equity

Bond

Money*

Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
None
Weak

Strong
None
Weak
None
None
Weak
Weak

Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong

SOURCE : Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy 1994.
*In Bonomo, Ferris, and Lamy (1994), there was no direct measurement
of money markets per se, but an analysis of the short-term interest rates is
considered in the literature as a reliable proxy.

in fixed income securities. Particularly in the cases of France and Italy, credit
ceilings were imposed statutorily, prohibiting the clearance of credit markets
in a fluid fashion . Also, in the case of selected European countries, the
capitalization of the equity markets fluctuated over the last 30 years based on
the nationalization of major financial institutions and industrial companies.
The worst cases were in France and the United Kingdom. In France, during
the early 1980s, massive nationalizations of the major banks, insurance
companies, and industrial companies occurred in all the principal areas of
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production (steel, shipbuilding, cement, etc.). This directly and indirectly
eliminated overnight about 20 percent of the Paris bourse's market
capitalization. 25
In the U.K., the opposite occurred as major industrial firms were
privatized, increasing the market capitalization weighting of nonfinancial or
industrial firms relative to financial institutions.

The privatization of

industrial companies under the Thatcher conservative government increased
the market capitalization by 7 percent. 26

2 5tfhe indirect effects a rc that ftrms were nationalized if they we re a subsidiary or
co ntrolled affiiliate of the nationa lized finan cial in stitu tion.

'JJlA secondary impact is the internatio nalization of the London Stock Excha nge, which,
in fact, is ca lled the International Stock E xchange. British fLrms re presen ted abo ut 43 perce nt
of tho market capitalization. Thi s like ly ex plains t ho wea k re lationship be tween the evolution
of theFT AU-Shares index and the Ba nk of Engla nd's discount ra te since non-British ftrm s are
nol affected by ste rling inte res t rates or credit limi tatio ns.
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CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BANK HEDGING
POLICY AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Hedging Policy in Perfect and

Complete Markets
The nature of financial innovation has unique implications for U.S.
commercial banks. The advent of a continually eroding deposit base and
increased nonbank competition has forced U.S. commercial banks to cultivate
new product ideas. Also, U.S. banks have been forced to accept additional
business risks in the form of interest rate and exchange rate exposure in order
to accommodate customer needs.
Within the framework of financial innovation, U.S. banks are uniquely
positioned to be both on the supply and demand sides. The demand side is
derived from the need to hedge interest rate and exchange rate exposure on the
traditional business activities of banks (lending, letters of credit, etc.). The
supply side is the opportunistic nature of profit maximizing firms, like banks,
to capitalize on the needs of clients who seek to hedge. These client needs may

be providing forward interest and exchange rates for trade, swaps to cover an
interest rate mismatch, or financial futures and options to cover the unhedged
portion, or basis risk, of a hedge already undertaken.
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In the seminal work ofModigliani and Miller (1958), a hedging firm has

been limited to three variables- taxes, contracting costs, and investment
decisions. According to Modigliani and Miller (a firm with a fixed investment
policy with no contracting costs or taxes), corporate financing policy is
irrelevant. They argue that if a firm decides to change its hedging policy,
investors who hold claims issued by the firm can change their holdings of risky
assets to offset the change in the firm's hedging policy, leaving the distribution
of their future wealth unaffected. This assumes that markets are perfect and
complete, making the firm 's hedging policy independent of its underlying
value. For example, if a firm hedges the value of an input by purchasing
forward contracts and that input price rises, the firm's pricing and production
policies should not be affected by the existence of the hedge. The opportunity
cost of the input is its current price, not the (sunk) cost of the forward contract.
This, of course, suggests t:.at a firm can pass the increased price of the
input to the final consumer through a higher overall product price without a
reduction in its operating margin.
A definition of hedging is provided by Smith and Stulz (1985). A hedge
is loosely defined as a trade in a particular future , forward, or option market,
also referred to as derivatives, even though there is no identifiable cash
position in the underlying commodity. A firm may also hedge by changing its
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underlying operating decisions.

Banks operate in many ways similar to a traditional firm in its demand
for a hedge. Adapting Smith and Stulz's (1985) work to banks alone lays the
groundwork for further analysis of bank hedge policy.
The nature of the financial risk may sometimes provide incentives for
banks to take positions in derivatives. If the effective risk at the maTgin on
banking institutions is an increasing function of a bank's market value, then
the risk-adjusted value of the bank is a concave function of its market value.
If hedging reduces the variability of bank market values, the expected bank

risk level is reduced and the expected ma1·ket value of the bank is increased,
as long as the cost of the hedge is not excessive. Line A of figure 4 illustrates
how the unhedged market value of a bank grows at a decreasing rate as the
risk level of banks increases at an accelerating rate.
Line B illustrates how the risk-adjusted market value of the bank
increases at an accelerating rate until the risk level is so great that, while the
market value of the bank may increase, the risk-adjusted value does not
increase. 28

27

/\

merger, for exa mple , ca n achiCvc the sa me results as hedging through finan c1al

contracts.
28 0 nc co uld eve n pos tulate that th e n s k-adju s ted bank value may actually drop eve n
af 1he ma rket valu e of th e bank incrca!:iCS af th e risk of loss is greate r than · I for every $ 1
mcrcase 111 market va lue.
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The influence of hedging is the difference between E(V- R) and
E(V- R:H). This suggests that the risk-adjusted market value of the bank will
diminish less than the absolute level of risk, E(R) minus E(R:H).
The growth of the bank's market value is a function of the level of risk
that a bank is willing to accept. Risk is loosely defined as any economic event
that may contribute to the variability or reduction of a bank's shareholder
equity value, either capital or current profit levels.
(1)

V(O) = EP,( V,- R (V;) V,)

Equation (1) represents the risk-adjusted market value of a bank, where

Pi is the price today of one dollar to be delivered in the state of the world i,
typically the bank's market share price. 29 R(VJ is the risk level or "rate" of
risk if the market value of the bank is
V "(O)- V(O)

=

vi.

P.(R( V.) V.- R(V. + H. )(V. + H .> )

+ Pb( R ( Vb) Vb - R( Vb + H b)( Vb +!Jb) ) >

(2)

0

Hedging can increase the market value of a bank if there exist two
states of the world, a and b, such that R(V.) < R(VJ. This is true if a bank
holds a hedged portfolio such that

v. +H.

= Vb + Hb, and that the hedge

portfolio is self-financing in the sense that P. H. + PbH b = 0. The last

29
In eoonomic theory, a fum's, in our case a bank's, s hare price represe nt.s not only the
market's evaluation of the firm's curre nt value but a lso incorporates all the expectational
information abo ut the evolution o f future profits co ns ide ring all available information .
In for mat ion is complete and perfect in our current scenario, suggesti ng that a ll future
mform atio n is incorporated into the share price.
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expression suggests that Ha and Hb are both equal to zero where the cost of
each hedge is costless.
Given an environment of costless hedges, banks are assumed not to
participate in derivative markets where hedges have explicit costs. A bank's
hedge strategy is limited to strategic behavior it may undertake to avoid or
diminish risk as its market value may decrease or increase. For example, in
an environment with increasing marginal tax rates, a bank's aggregate tax
liability will increase at an accelerating rate as its market value increases,
denoted by line A in figure 4. Line B reflects the posttax market value of the
bank. It will increase at a decelerating rate until the marginal tax rate
reaches 100 percent.
An appropriate hedge, that would be costless as well, would be

accelerating the depreciation of fixed assets (i.e., real estate) or of goodwill to
reduce pretax earnings. The implementing of such a strategy by banks would
increase a bank's posttax value until E(V)-C* =E(V- R: I0 or E(V) =E(V- R: ~0 + C*.
Another example in the case of banks would be for the creation of
reserve levels for bad debts that exceed statutory requirements but do not
exceed the limits stipulated by fiscal authorities. This would cause line A to
shift inward becoming line A ' and line B to shift upward forming line B '
diminishing the influence of the marginal tax rate upon the bank's posttax
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market value. In essence the posttax market value of the bank will increase
as a result of the more generous reserve policy.30
The other form of a potentially costless hedge would be a manager's
overall economic incentives to undertake risk. In a bank the maximum value
at risk for shareholders is the paid-in capital. A bank can reduce its risk
imposed on other claimholders by hedging. This suggests that if the reduction
in the compensation of managers, employees, and other suppliers plus the
increased revenues from customers exceeds the costs of hedging, hedging
increases the value of the firm.
If the manager's compensation is a function of the bank's market value,
the manager's expected utility will be to increase the bank's value. However,
given the nature and structure of the incentive, a bank hedging policy may be
affected. For example, if the manager's utility is a convex function of the
bank's market value, the manager has a higher expected value of the bank if
it is not hedged at all. Bonus or stock options provisions can make a manager's
utility function convex, where more is always better, making the manager a
risk seeker.
If the manager's utility function is a concave function , then the
manager's optimal hedging for the bank will be to hedge completely. The
30 The reg ulatory authorities, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the F'DIC a re more
roncerned with the solvency of commercial banks and, as a result, would prefe r generous reserve
levels. The fiscal or tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), is more concern ed with
the bank paying the highest level of taxes in the aggregate and keeping the r eserve levels as fine
t uned as possible.
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expected income of the manager is maximized if the firm is completely hedged.
So, since the manager is risk averse, he will choose to bear risk only if he is
rewarded by doing so with higher income. Since his expected income is
maximized when the firm is completely hedged, the manager will choose to
bear no risk. This suggests that the manager's compensation is high in current
terms and has an incentive to undertake a costless hedge by not undertaking
new projects. This type of manager will also attempt to harvest existing
profitable ventures and cut overhead expenditures to increase the bank's
market value.

B. Bank Hedging Policy in Imperfect
and Incomplete Markets
The previous section outlined a theory of hedging limited to market
failures caused by a government's tax regime, contracting costs, and
managerial incentives. 31
The "incomplete" and "imperfect'' nature of markets for U.S. commercial
banks relates to the extent that they undertake exposure to interest rates.
Interest rate exposure is the uncertainty introduced into a bank's earnings by
possible changes in interest rates (Stigum and Branch 1985). This definition
expands the possible list of market failures where a bank may have an

31 The issue of co ntracting costs is of little in terest to our research because it has bee n
exte nsively stuctied by others. The research has generally focused on the implicatio ns of FDI C
insura nce on bank be havior and profitability as opposed to financial innovations per se.
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incentive to undertake a hedge outlined initially by Modigliani and Miller
(1958).
The inherent nature of commercial banks is to accept some degree of
interest rate exposure. Banks in the 1980s consciously adjusted the structure
of their balance sheets to increase their interest rate exposure in an attempt
to earn profits higher than those that would accrue from operating as a broker.

For the larger U.S. banks, lending rates are low relative to their cost of
funds, making the spreads they earn on brokering small.

In order for

commercial lending to be profitable, many U.S. banks have had to assume
additional interest rate exposure. For example, in an environment where the
interest rate yield curve is positively sloped, banks are often tempted to lend
long term and take short-term deposits in order to improve lending margins
and act as an intermediary as opposed to a broker.
The logical solution would be to match assets and liabilities and simply
act as a broker. However, empirical research indicates that spreads on
brokering tend to vary inversely with the size of the bank. In other words, the
larger the bank, the smaller the average lending spread (Kalchbrenner 1985).
This suggests that in order to maximize profits, the typical large
commercial bank must have an asset and liability mismatch or "gap" that
would look like figure 5 and behave as an intermediary (Stigum and Branch
1985).
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The level of interest rate exposure and the fluctuating value of its
capital are the principal risks that bankers are required to hedge a 2 The
market risk measures of banks are considered in equation (3) as a function of
interest rate exposure, financial leverage and the variability of bank profits.
Market Risk Measures

= f(GAP , LEV , VAR) .

(3)

In the 1980s, the high and volatile nominal interest rates associated with
contemporary inflation prompted a pronounced change in commercial bank

b'
.,

'·

III

"

.'

'

l
1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 12M 2Y 5Y 10Y 20Y20+Y

!II

Liabilities

D

Assets

5.-Hypothetical worldwide interest rate exposure of a money
center bank (percent).
FIG .

32 0 ther ma rket measures are considered in the economic lite ra ture but arc not
considered within the context of fin a ncial innovation. F'or example, Liang a nd Rhoades ( 199 1) ,
Hassa n (1 992), a nd Blanco a nd Pa wson (forthco ming) re searched the importance of prud e nt
asset divers ification , adequate ca pita l, securitization of certain loan assets, and a balanced
fin a ncial levera ge. However, Kau fma n ( 1994) s uggested t hat these issues a re t he outcomes of
poo r interest rate mana ge me nt policies by commc rcta l banks.
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balance sheets. In the absence of low-cost deposits, banks have had to pursue
high and increasingly more expensive funding sources. As a result, banks
have foregone fixed rate loans in favor of variable rate loans to better match
assets and liabilities.
If a bank decides to undertake loans that are not "matched" and not act
merely as a broker to intermediate between depositors and borrowers, then a
mismatch will exist between the duration of the assets and liabilities. The
bank in this case transforms the asset by modifying the attributes of the
financial claims (duration, divisibility, etc.) and through financial innovations
(derivatives or securitization) hedge away as much of the interest rate
exposure as possible (Deshmukh, Greenbaum , and Kanatas 1983).
The greater the level of the gap or mismatch, the greater the risk the
bank has assumed.

To study this phenomenon one should consider an

environment whereby the demand for loans is perfectly elastic at an uncertain
rate of interest r d and a supply of funds that is also elastic and whose interest
rate is also unknown at r,. The bank is subject to a funding constraint of its
own arising from a statutory capital requirement, L . The bank will borrow
some amount to fund its loan demand L 0 , where L 0 s L always, at some known
funding rate r, *. The variable L 0 represents the bet that a bank is willing to
take on interest rates where rd > r, *and r, * :? r,. Since the underlying risk is
obtaining a cost of funding above the prevailing rate of interest borrowers are
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willing to pay for a loan, the bank's exposure is the initial level of funding, L 0 .
The risk-seeking bank would borrow L 0 = L .33 The expected profits of a bank
that decides to operate a mismatched loan portfolio is reflected below in
equation (4) where E(•) is the expectation operator.
rt(L 0 ) = E(rd)L 0 + (L - L 0 )E(Max(rd- r,, O))-r, *L0 ,L0 ~ L

(4)

The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is the expected
interest revenue from actual lending. The second term represents the expected
interest revenue based on the unutilized lending capacity. This second term
will become zero because a bank that operates a mismatched loan portfolio
intends to maximize profits and would leave no unused capacity. The third
term is the known cost of borrowing L 0 in advance.
As the level of uncertainty of rd increases, banks will have a greater

tendency to operate as brokers with a matched loan portfolio as opposed to
running a mismatched loan book to attempt to increase their gross lending
spread. The increased uncertainty of rd will lower the probability of banks
making the right "bet" on interest rates, decreasing th e likelihood of an
attractive return.
An increase in the absolute level of rd relative to r, will generally leave

the spread the same or greater as interest rates increase. This suggests that
higher and more volatile interest rates influence bank hedging behavior in

33The

ba nk t hat acts as a broker would bo L0

=0.
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opposing directions. Higher loan rates provide incentives for banks to operate
a mismatch in their loan portfolios while interest rate volatility will drive
banks to match assets and liabilities and act as brokers.
The same concept holds for r,, which remains unknown, even if rd is
known , the bank's expected profit, equation (4), will yield the same result.
Banks will lend as much possible, since L 0 = L holds, so they will continue to
mismatch assets and liabilities if a mean-preserving spread- shown in
equation (5)- is maintained.
E(rd) - r,•

2

(5)

E[Max(rd - r,, 0)]

The left-hand side of equation (5) represents the forecasted lending
spread the bank perceives it can obtain, given its expectation of future interest
rates, loan demand, and its actual cost of funding. This becomes the mean
preserving spread for banks that operate as an intermediary running a
mismatched loan portfolio.
The right-hand side of the equation is the mean preserving spread
where the bank acts merely as a broker.
So as the volatility of r, increases, the probability of higher and lower
values increases as well. The broker's expected marginal profit will be higher,
since it will never make a loan with a negative spread where

rd < r,

and the

possibility of a lower r, makes the spread potentially higher. The left-hand
side of equation (5) will remain unchanged under this scenario. The overall
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impact will be for banks to increasingly behave as brokers as the volatility of
r, increases.

A seco nd ary effect would be an increased allocation of bank assets
towards securities away from loans as banks regularly reinvest the loan
r epayments they receive (Keeton 1994). Table 9 shows what portion of the
reallocation process to more securities and less loans is attributable to an
increased level of volatility in interest rates.
According to Keeton (1994), having an understanding of what particular
shock s have influenced past changes in bank security holdings will suggest
how plausible it is that the same kind of shock can explain th e recent ch ange.

TABLE 9
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION FOR RATIO OF SECUR ITIES TO POTENTIAL
GDP, 1960-90

Category

Fed Funds rate
GDP
Inflation
Loans
Core deposits
Large time deposits
Securities
Total

SOU RC'E: Keeton 1994.

Percentage of Variance Over
3.5-Year Period

10
19
27

24
2
5
_13.

100
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The first row of table 9 illustrates that over a 3.5-year period, 10 percent of the
variation of th e security ratio from the level expected at the beginning of the
period tended to be due to unexpected changes in the Fed Funds rate. The
three macroeconomic variables and loans account for much of the past
variation in the security ratio. After a period of 3.5 years, shocks to these four
variables tend to explain 80 percent of the variation from the level initially
expected in the security ratio.
These results are consistent with economic theory and empirical
research, which assert that interest rate volatility due to changes in the Fed
Funds rate, fluctuating inflation levels, etc. , increase risk levels forcing banks
to undertake corresponding hedges. The Keeton (1994) article highlights one
such hedge- the reallocation of assets away from loans to securities.

C. Some Applications of Bank Hedging
Strategies and Financial Innovation
Banks in the previous two sections were limited to hedging-increased
risk attributable to a progressive tax regime, perverse managerial compensation incentives, and the volatility of the demand and supply price of credit.
The proposed theory has limited bank hedging policy to strategic actions of
foregoing or limiting certain business activities (i.e., changing management's
compensation incentives, stopping or operating a mismatched loan portfolio) .
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This section explores some of the diagnostic tools and remedies that
financial innovation has afforded banks in addressing the issue of interest rate
risk. The financial innovations utilized by banks fall under the rubric of
interest rate management. Interest rate management within a bank attempts
to evaluate the magnitude of the institution's risk concerning the duration of
assets and liabilities and to implement solutions that cover any imbalance that
may exist. These solutions assist bankers to mitigate and possibly avoid losses
in the event of a volatile or rising interest rate climate, which historically has
impacted U.S. banks negatively.
The four innovations selected for this section include interest rate
swaps, futures, options, and securitization. Each has played an important role
in the interest rate management process.
Other financial innovations like currency-related derivative products
and other off-balance activities (i.e., letters of credit, securities underwriting,
etc.), which have played a relevant though smaller role, are not discussed.
Interest rate exposure for banks highlighted in the previous section is
manifested when interest rates increase, causing banks to realize market
losses if unhedged. The nature of the new financial innovation is to create an
asset that moves in the opposite direction of, say bond prices, when interest
rates increase. The ideal structure of a financial innovation, like derivatives,
will covary in exactly the same magnitude in opposite directions. So, if bond

prices were to drop 2 percent, the value of the ideal interest rate future or
option would increase 2 percent, providing a perfect hedge.
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D. Duration Analysis and Bank
Hedging Policy
Duration is an important diagnostic tool utilized by banks to evaluate
the average of assets and liabilites. It is a more precise measure of the life of
assets, bond and loans, liabilities, deposits, and borrowings than maturity,
because it takes into consideration any cash flows that are received. The
larger the cash flow , the lower the duration, or interest rate risk, of the bond.
Specifically, duration is calculated as the weighted average time to
maturity of a bond, using the relative present values of the cash flows as
weights. The calculation yields a single number called Macauley's duration
that is expressed in units of time, which corresponds to the receipt of cash
flows. Macauley's duration essentially represents the present value of the cash
flow payments over time.
Consider again the example of bank A It owns a 10-year bond with a
6 percent annual coupon. The bank has taken $100 in 10-year deposits at 4
percent.

Interest is due and payable at maturity, a zero coupon type

arrangement.
The bank appears to be matched with a 2 percent gross spread margin.
However, the average duration of the bond is 7.62 years versus the 10-year
duration of the deposit being 10 years. There is a mismatch.
Those duration figures were substituted for equation (6) to calculate the
modified duration. Modified duration predicts the sensitivity of a bond or bank
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deposits to increases in interest rates. Assume bond and bank deposit rates
of interest increase to 7 and 5 percent, respectively.
The basic formula for modified duration is, D equals the Macauley
duration figure and r is the current market rate of interest where using the
scenario above, the Dm for the
D

(6)

( 1 + r)

bond is 7.12, suggesting that the bond price will decline by 6.54 percent to
$93.46. The Dm for the bank deposit is 9.52, suggesting that the market value
of the bank deposit will drop 4. 76 percent to $95.24.
The difference between assets and liabilities equals $95.24 - $93.46 =
$1. 78. It represents a capital deficiency between assets and liabilities that

must be covered by applying some of the bank's uncommitted tier I capital. A
more efficient mechanism for bank A would have been to hedge this exposure
beforehand in the financial futures and options and avoid fluctuations in its
capital base.
The risk exposure of bank A in our scenario is an asset/liability
mismatch of 7.62 to 10 years, outlined previously, and a disproportional level
of sensitivity towards interest rates. With the current composition of assets
and liabilities, bank A will generate a $1 .78 capital deficiency for every $100
in assets for every 1 percent increase in interest rates if unhedged.
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E. Bank Hedging Instruments
1. Interest Rate Swaps

Most of the research literature cites the benefits of swaps as an interest
rate risk management tool (Wall and Pringle 1990; Smith, Smithson, and
Wakemann 1986). Aspinwall (1982) suggests three kinds of general responses
to undesired interest rate exposure: widen the spread between revenue and
cost, restructure the balance sheet, or use derivative market contracts. A
wider spread offers a cushion for a bank to absorb interest rate risk. Widening
the spread may not be a viable long-run alternative because customers may be
lost in competitive loan and deposit markets.
The restructuring of asset or liability accounts to achieve the desired
relationship between interest rate reset dates may also be an imperfect
alternative for managing interest rate risk. Variable-rate instead of fixed-rate
lending may transform interest rate risk into credit risk for the bank.
Customers also may have the same view as the bank on the direction of future
interest rates. Balance sheet restructuring may lead to increased costs or
decreased costs or decreased revenues because banks may have to offer
premium rates on deposits or discounts on loans to attract customers to its
desired deposit or loan product characteristics. The bank can solve the
problem of customer resistence by converting the fixed-rate deposits desired
by customers expecting a decline in rates into a floating rate cash flow through
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an interest rate swap. The bank can then take advantage of falling rates and
yet still be able to meet its customers' needs by issuing long-term deposits and
offering variable-rate loans.

It is also argued that interest rate swaps are cheaper and more flexible
than restructuring existing liabilities. Using domestic bond markets to reissue
debt is costly because a credit rating from a rating agency is often required,
and other costs such as advertising, legal fees, and an underwriter spread
make it an expensive proposition (Loeys 1985). Wall and Pringle (1990) also
argue that interest rate swaps provide a low-cost method of making immediate
changes in a firm 's exposure to market interest rates and are more flexible
than exchange-traded futures and options. Interest rate swaps can provide
interest rate risk management benefits to swapping parties without depending
on the existence of a quality spread differential.
The level of interest rate swaps is a function of the duration mismatch
and quality differential between counterparties and the anticipated covariance
between assets and liabilities in the future.

Equation (7) illustrates this

relationship:
(7)

where

S,, is level of interest rate swaps; qJ is interest rate quality differential

between counterparties;

Dmis

is mismatch in the duration between asset and
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liabilites; E(Cov AL) is expected covariance between the duration of future
assets and liabilities.
Consider bank C with a hypothetical $100 loan portfolio that yields the
prime rate of interest plus 50 basis points, a floating rate of interest, financed
by $100 of 10-year bonds at 10 percent; while bank D has a hypothetical $100
loan portfolio in fixed-rate mortgages financed with short-term bank deposits.
Both banks are motivated to hedge their interest rate exposure because of the
obvious asset and liability mismatch .
The swap may be constructed in the following fashion. Bank D agrees to
pay bank C a fixed rate of 10 percent per year on $100 for 10 years supported
by its fixed-rate mortgage portfolio. Bank C will pay bank D the prime rate of
interest plus 50 basis points based on its variable or floating rate loan portfolio.
Though our example illustrates a scenario with no quality differential,
there exist many other situations where one of the counterparties may not need
to hedge but rather is making a market for smaller financial institutions. The
incentive for the market-making bank is to capture the quality differential and
assist the smaller financial institution to hedge its risk.
This product development element of the interest rate swap market is
relevant but controlled by a small number of commercial banks in the United
States. The top five banks control about 80 percent of the interest rate swap
volume. Most other U.S. banks undertake an interest swap to hedge interest
rate risk on their balance sheets.
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2. Interest Rate Futures and Option
The concept of interest rate futures and options is to mark up the
underlying spot price of an asset by the estimated appreciation- at least the
rate of interest- plus custodial and administrative fees to hold the asset.
Equation (8) represents the hypothetical future price for any asset:
(8)

where F 0 is current future price; P, is current spot price; i0 is current market
rate of interest; and C1 is custodial and adminsitrative fees.
Equation (8) shows that future value will move inversely to the value of
the fixed income security. In the event of an increase in i0, the value of a bond,
or any other fixed rate security, will cause bond prices to drop . However, the
futures price will move inversely since an increase in i0 will increase the value
of the right-hand side of equation (8), hence, the value of F 0.
A more rigorous approach is also considered. Let P0 be the initial price
of a bond (i.e., $100) and P 1 equals the future value of the sanoe asset, which is
uncertain. Let Pt be the mean of P 1, and &P denotes the standard deviation of
Pt - P0 .

The variables F0 and F 1 refer to the initial and ending futures prices,
with F 1"' being the mean value of F 1, and &P denoting the standard deviation of
the futures price change. The hedge will consist of a short position in h units
of futures for every unit of the cash position. The correlation between the
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current price, or cash, position and the futures price is p. The gain per unit on
the portfolio is the price change on the cash position minus h times the change
in the futures price.
Gain

(P 1rn - P0 )

-

h(F1rn - F0 )

(9)

.

The expected gain is then:
expected gain = (P1 - P 0 )

-

h(F1 - F 0 )

,

(10)

where h* would be the optimal hedge and is expressed as pO/Or, where h* is the
covariance between the price change of the current or cash price and the price
change of the futures contract, divided by the variance of the price change of the
futures contract. Unless p

= 1 or -1,

there will be some residual risk or some

unhedged portion of the original cash position (Figlewski 1986).
Consider a hypothetical example where bank A holds an asset with a
nominal value of$100 with a nominal rate of interest of 7 percent and a 10-year
maturity. It desires to hedge the asset's return and conserve its lending spread
over its cost of funds. Bank B also holds a $100 asset at 7 percent, would like
to increase the marginal return of its portfolio, and is prepared to write an
interest rate option on its asset.
So bank B writes an option on its asset for 25 cents for 360 days at
current levels. Bank A decides to acquire the option and pays 25 cents to bank
B for an interest rate option of 7 percent on a $100 asset with a 10-year
maturity. Bank A has purchased insurance for itself against future fluctuations
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in interest rates. Bank B has successfully increased its marginal return but has
accepted additional risk.
If interest rates remain unchanged or decreased over the 360-day period,
bank A would not exercise the option and obtain a net yield of 6. 75 percent
while bank B would have yielded 7.25 percent. 34
In the event interest rates increase to 7.50 percent, the underlying value
of the asset will decrease to $96.75, increasing the value of the option
progressively to $3.25 on the 359th day. Bank A could sell its option and
recover its losses or force bank B to deliver $100 to bank A on the 360th day.
Bank B would realize a net loss of $3.00 (25 cents- $3.25 = -$3.00) (Solomon,
Marshall, and Pepper 1983).
The most efficient mechanism for Bank A would have been to sell the
option just prior to the expiration date to avoid the transaction costs of selling
the underlying asset.

3. Asset Securitization
The level oflending was traditionally a function of the rate of interest and
the expected return that banks hoped to obtain (Stiglitz and Weiss 1971). The
securitization market has transformed traditional lending practices to be a

34
Th e value of the option would have dropped substantially if interest rates dropped,
making it a perfunctory exercise. For e xample, if the market rate of interest drops from 7
percent to 6 percent, the market value of the asset would incr ease to $107.50. The value of the
optio n would move in the opposite direction and would eve ntually equal zero o n the expiration
date or 360 th da y.
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function of the amount banks expect to make by originating and servicing
securitized loans and the risk premium that investors can obtain versus other
fixed income vehicles.
Securitization impacts the level of a bank's interest rate exposure by
removing from a bank's balance sheet those assets that remain unhedged, and
improves the bank's return on assets at the margin.
The outstanding balance of a bank's securitized asset pool is a function
of the prevailing rate of interest, r, and future expectations of borrowers and
investors considering the state of world, n : Traditionally, as r falls, a certain
percentage of borrowers will prepay their mortgage and refinance at the lower
rate of interest, causing the outstanding balance of securitized assets to fall.
The parameter n increases as the level of uncertainty among borrowers and
investors increases. For example, if many borrowers have been on the sidelines
watching interest rates drop and believe that interest rates will increase in the
near future, the rate of prepayment will increase.
In the case of the investor, the level of uncertainty could increase if the
perceived credit quality of the underlying borrowers were to change.
Equation (10) represents the level of oustanding securitized assets based
on the current change in interest rates and the perception of the state of the
world by borrowers and investors:

x· = x~ '

Ar>"

X>O

(10)
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where X" is the current value of the outstanding securitized asset pool; X 0 is the
original level of securitized assets; !:J.r is the change in interest rates; and n is
the perception of the state of the world by borrowers and investors.
Assuming X0 equals 10, the outstanding balance of securitized assets
based on different values for !:J.r and n is shown in table 10, where Llr < 1 and
n>O .

The management of a portfolio of securitzed assets directly affects the
profitability of a bank. The underlying profit function of a bank changes if it
decides to securitize a portion of its loan portfolio. The new function modifies
equation (4) by incorporating the impact of equation (10):

where P represents the margin that banks obtain to administer the securitized
asset pool on behalf of investors.

TABLE 10
EVOLUTION OF THE O UTSTANDING BALANCE OF SECURITIZED AsSETS

!:J.r/ n

-.01
-.03
-.05

9.7723
9.3325
8.9125

2

3

9.552
8.720
7.989

9.3387
8.178
7.200
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The second term on the right-hand side of equation (11) represents the
marginal contribution that securitization represents to earnings. The marginal
increase in the bank's return on equity (ROE) is represented by equation (12):

~ROE = P·X'
K

(12)
'

where K represents the bank's shareholder equity.
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CHAPTERV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL
INNOVATION UPON U.S. BANK PROFITABILITY

This chapter attempts to evaluate the implications of financial
innovations, namely off-balance sheet transactions (OBS), upon the return on
equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA) of U.S. banks.

The research

literature has discovered that the adoption pattern of financial innovations
within banks has followed a logistic time curve (Davies 1979). The basic model,
developed by Davies and later enhanced by Jagtiani, Saunders, and Udell
(1995), states that the principal OBS financial innovations (FIOBS), namely
interest rate swaps, interest rate futures and options, and asset securitization,
as compared to traditional OBS activities like standby letters of credit, are
expected to grow over time as OBS financial technology is diffused among banks
as a function of capital.
The speed of adoption by financial institutions could only be conditional
upon capital adequacy and requirements if capital shortage was an
industrywide problem. Also, FIOBS, like interest rate swaps, interest rate
futures and options, etc., require well-capitalized institutions and are not for
those that are attempting to make up for capital shortfalls by diversifying into
OBS activities.

In particular, the likelihood and extent of swap market
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participation by undercapitalized banks have been found to be less than for the
well-capitalized banks (Kim and Koppenhaver 1992).
One can examine various profitability measures (nJ and financial
innovation parameters in determining the implications of OBS growth. These
profitability measures include ROE and ROA. The general form of the model
evaluates the direct influence of FIOBS activities, or financial innovation
parameters, on each profitability measure. It can be asserted that the changing
nature of the banking industry in the 1980s induced these institutions to
undertake more OBS activities- not because of more rigorous capital
requirements but because of pressure to improve the level of the institution's
financial performance and limit the variability of earnings to increase the
banks' posttax value.

A. Data Set

The data utilized were obtained from the FDIC call reports for 1990
through 1994 for all U.S commercial banks with total assets of $1 billion or
more. The number of banks ranged from 245 to 264 per year. The data set was
adjusted to eliminate all foreign bank branches that are not statutorily required
to report all ledger items to U.S. authorities. The remaining banks reporting
ranged from 135 to 163 annually during the specified period.
Forty-three to 70 banks, depending on the year, did not report a full five
years of data for the following reason(s): (1) the bank had not reached $1 billion
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in assets until after 1990, (2) the bank fell below $1 billion in assets during any
of the five years, or (3) the bank was acquired, merged, or sold a significant
portion of its assets to another bank. Banks that exhibited one or more of these
problems were eliminated from the sample to facilitate constructing a complete
cross-sectional time series for the reporting banks.
The data were transformed into ratios to avoid any scale effects that may
be generated in the results.
Figure 6 indicates the evolution of the level (ROA) and variance
(VARROA) of earnings with respect to assets. A similar relationship exists for

the level of ROE and variance (VARROE) of earnings with respect to
shareholder equity or capital.
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Figure 7 illustrates the level of financial innovation (DERIVA) as a
percentage of assets. DERIVA is equal to the sum of the notional principal for
all interest rate swaps, interest rate futures and options, and securitized assets

(Federal Housing Association, Farmer MAC, and private) divided by total
assets. The increased utilization of financial innovation demonstrates the
growing acceptance by U.S. banks to incorporate financial derivatives as a part
of its funding and interest rate management strategy. This increased usage,
according to some, has increased the riskiness of banks and fragility of the
financial system (Niggle 1986).
Table 11 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the key
variables utilized in analyzing the effects of FIOBS utilization across U.S.
banks.
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TABLE 11
D ESCRIPTIVE STATISTI CS OF KEY VARIABLES

St is ,
Variabl e

Mea n

L Profitability measures
ROE
0.140727
ROA
0.010597

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

0. 186294
0.012898

4.26466
0.057154

·2.3789 1
-0.08251 I

0.299525
0.013557

17.0128
0.009099

L27E-05
L73E- 10

0.706286
0.0000189

I L Ri s k measures
VARROE

0.08960

0.009187

VARROA

0.000189

3.66£-05

Ill. Operating variables
PREM
0.011036
1.08967
DEP
7.6109
ORISK
2.762 10
NONTRAD
0.090197
MARGIN
0.008905
LOSSRAT
0.070925
LIQUID
0.064309
EXPN

0.00056
0.803971
0.04760 I
2. 6630
0.083407
0.006188
0.056223
0.061680

IV. Financial innovation varia bles
DERIVA
0.64882
10.3072
DERIVE
SWA
0.83494
5.5527
SWE
0.292524
FUTOPT
4.70934
FUTOPTE

0. 161 584
2.37734
0. 176004
1.66631
0.017797
0.253716

SECRAT

0.002732

0.00

SE CE

0.045114

0.00

3.02449
3.97E-10
22.3406
-0.003178
·2792 .95
2288.63
-130.657
16.7534
0.294119
0.009962
0.078217
0.00
0.00
0.348661
0. 159970
0 .010195

16.26883
308.0006
24 .0775
162.8406
9.4 239
163 .38 12
0. 135 149
2.640308

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0. 136712
1.299565
157. 748
6 .5277
0.032365
0.009272
0.062047
0.018904

1.69573
5.609 17
2. 15650
15. 1665
0.918835
16.00945
0.01077
. 18586 1
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Table 11 is divided into four segments- profitability measures, risk
measures, operating variables, and financial innovation variables. Parts III and
IV are the principal explanatory variables used to analyze the strategic usage
of financial derivatives among U.S. banks.
The variable MARGIN represents total interest income minus total
interest expense divided by total assets. Generally, the bigger the lending
margin (the spread over the cost offunds), the greater the level of profitability
for banks. The bank's overhead expenditures are represented by EXPN, which
is the sum of salaries and benefits, cost of premises and equipment, and
noninterest income divided by total assets. This variable is a measure of a
bank's budgetary discipline concerning its operating expenditures. The more
inexpensive a bank's operating structure as a percentage of assets, the higher
the level of profitability.
The risk preferences of banks are evaluated by the variables DEP and
PREM. The variable DEP is the level of interest paid on all deposits, including
certificates of deposits greater than $100,000 , divided by total liabilities. This
measures the dependency of banks on deposited funds relative to other bank
funding sources. The variable PREM is the variance of the interest paid on
certificates of deposits greater than $100,000 relative to total liabilities. This
variable indicates the volatility of the premium that banks must pay for funds .
This is considered to be a true indicator of the market premium that a bank
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must pay to capture third-party deposits and a good proxy for measuring a
bank's solvency or credit rating. As PREM decreases, the ROE of banks is
expected to increase.
The variable ORISK is the variance of operating expenses relative to
operating income. The risk of insolvency or the revision of a bank's credit rating
is directly related to the possibility of operating expenses exceeding operating

income. Section C of this chapter highlights the inverse relationship between
operating expense and profitability. An increase in the variance of a bank's
operating expenses may contribute to increased variance of earnings.
The variable entitled NONTRAD represents the sum of all real estate
loans, foreign loans, and fixed assets, including premises relative to total assets.
Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) learned that a change in the asset
composition of U.S. S&Ls towards more traditional assets can influence
profitability.

A positive relationship between nontraditional assets and

variability of profits would suggest that banks may have increased the value of
the FDIC subsidy and the bank's posttax value at the expense of more risk in
the form of greater volatility in earnings.
The level of a bank's liquidity highlights its ability to borrow and sell
assets that have a ready market value without incurring substantial losses. The
variable UQUID is the best indicator of this phenomenon and assesses a bank's
available resources to meet short-run cash outflows or to use them as ready
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collateral for borrowing funds. It has been assumed that bank liquidity has a
positive relationship with the variability of profitability.
The variable LOSSRAT is the sum of loans 90 days past due and
nonaccruals with respect to assets. According to Berger, King, and O'Brien
(1991), the level of loan losses to assets is an indicator of a bank's risk
preference and is assumed to have a positive relationship with respect to the
variability of bank earnings.
The influence of financial innovation variables is represented by
DERIVA(E), which is the sum of the notional principal amount of interest rate
swaps, the volume of interest rate futures and options, and the outstanding
balance of all securitized assets relative to total assets or shareholder's equity
or capital. The growth in the level of derivatives by bank imposes a direct
expense to operations in order to hedge but can be welfare-increasing for banks
that may be risk-seeking. The introduction of this variable is an extension of
Berger's (1995) model and allows one to evaluate the contribution of financial
innovations to bank profitability at the margin.
The next three variables represent the influence of specific classes of
financial innovation with respect to total assets. The variable SWA(E) is the
notional principal value of interest rate swaps with respect to assets and capital.
While FUTOPT(E) is the sum of the volume of interest rate futures and options
with respect to assets and capital, the SWA and FUTOPT are consistent with
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th e model specification used in Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996). The final
variab les, often overlooked SECRAT and SECE, are the sum of all securitized
asse ts as a percentage of assets. Blanco and Fawson (1995) highlight the
welfare gains to banks, which can securitize assets, permitting profitability to
improve at the margin. All financial innovation variables are expected to h ave
a nega tive or inverse relationship with the variability of ROE and ROA.

B. Methodology
The empirical analysis of the profitability measures utilize three forms
of regression analysis. The first form of analysis is entitled "Pool," which
stacked th e data by year for all banks. Dummy variables were introduced to
accou nt for the time-series nature of the data and correct for autocorrelation.
The regression error in such a model, for GLS as well, is composed of a time a nd
cro s-sec tional component.

The estimators are based on a covariance

transformation and generally are more efficient for known variance compon ents
for finite sa mples (Wallace and Hussain 1969).
The use of dummy variables would force no restrictions on th e pattern of
hi.ftin g regression intercepts, while the error component model wo uld presume
that th e pattern follows a norm al distribution. Specifically, assume that the
cross-section intercept has a mean of au and a variance of o 2u. The co mbin ed
error component has a mean of 0 and a variance of o2"'. These two assumptions
are eq uivalent to the assumption that the error component has a variance of
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The effect of the mean of the normally distributed intercepts (av)

with variance (a2) will be accounted for by the inclusion of a constant term

(p 0)

in the pooled regression equation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).
Y,

= Po+ L

a,D, +

L P1 ~ + E,

(13)

Po is the constant term; a, is the time coefficient on the ith bank; Pi is the

where

jth parameter of the ith bank; D, is the time dummy; and

E,

is the error term at

timet.
The error would then include three components and would have variance:
Var(e,,) =a: + a~

+

o~

(14)

The second form is generalized least squares (GLS) with fixed effects,
which is used when the data exhibit autocorrelation and the true value of o2 is
unknown . The fixed effects model assumes that the parameter values shift in
the same way across all banks. The model is useful in detecting which banks
may yield significant statistical results individually (Greene 1993). The GLS
regression utilized the variance of the residual values as the cross-sectional
weight on the time series. Again, the results exhibit a reduction in the degrees
of freedom due to missing observations for certain banks (Gujarti 1992;
Griffiths, Hill, and Judge 1993).
Y, = ta, + X, P + e,

Let Y, and X, be the T observations for the ith bank, and let

(15)
E,

be the

associated T x 1 vector of disturbances. The values of the coefficients and test
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statistics (in parentheses) for the dummy variable of each individual bank are
reported in appendix B.
The third form of regression analysis utilized used a GLS random effects
model to relax the assumption that all banks are not systematically correlated
and whose operating and financial innovation parameters may shift to varying
degrees. The random effects view individual specific constant terms as randomly
distributed across banks. This is considered appropriate if one believes that the
strategic behaviors of U.S. banks are unrelated to each other. For example,
macroeconomic factors are assumed to affect banks randomly and not in a
common systematic manner. The underlying regression model is outlined in
equation (16).
(16)
where the component

u, is the random disturbance characterizing the ith

observation and is constant through time. In the analysis of the various banks,
it represents the collection offactors not in the regression that is specific to each
bank.
The White test was utilized to evaluate the existence ofheteroscedasticity
in the data for all models. Once the data were transformed from the levels to
ratios, no heteroscedasticity was found. The White test is based on the
comparison of the sample variance of least-squares estimators under
homoscedasticity and under heteroscedasticity. The test involves applying the
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least-squares method and calculating the coefficient of determination called:
nR2w· The underlying null hypothesis is expressed in equation (17), where n is

the number of observations
(17)

The test results failed to reject the null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity for
all models (Kmenta 1986).
A test for endogeneity was conducted between the level of financial
innovation and the variability of the profitability measures and tested
statistically insignificant.

C. Impact of Financial innovation on
Bank Profitability
The profitability measures in our model are the endogenous variables.
The exogenous variables capture bank revenue, expense, risk preference, and
financial innovation. By examining the variation of the selected exogenous
variables in the model against the profitability measures, one can study the
observed behavior of the banks (Berger 1995). The model is specified as follows :
1t =

(Margin , Expn , Deriva , Dep, Prem) .

(18)

The coefficients for each parameter reflect the rate of change of the
profitability measure relative to the key operating variables and the aggregate
or individual level of financial innovation(s) (interest rate swaps, etc.) across
banks.
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The signs of the coefficient are illustrated below, suggesting that U.S.
banks, like manufacturers, have strong incentives to innovate to achieve
economies of scope. Economies of scope in banking are achieved if a bank
becomes more profitable or efficient to produce more products or services
without changing the capital base.
a ll
> 0 ~ < 0
~
a ll
a Margin
' a Expn
' a Deriva(e)

o, ~ " o,
a Dep

a ll
, 0 .
a Prem

The regression results are shown in tables 12 and 13.
In table 12, the results indicate that MARGIN is significant at the 1
percent level, depending on the functional form of the regression model. The
"pool" and "GIS" results suggest that lending margins or spreads are strongly
correlated among banks.
The EXPN variable is significant at the 1 percent level for all regression
forms with the appropriate negative sign. This suggests that there is a strong
s tatistical relationship between the cost of a bank's operating structure in the
U.S . and ROA. The seemingly unrelated effect of operating costs on assets is
rejected and supports the idea that bankers select products that are cost
efficient to administer. This furthers the notion that banks have incentives to
adopt process innovations (ATMs, automated money transfer systems, etc.) that
reduce the cost per transaction and improve profitability at the margin .
The variable entitled DERIVA in our model is the proxy for financial
innovation. The variable tests insignificant statistically for the "pool" and "pool
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TABLE 12
INFLUENCE OF FIOBS A CTIVITIES ON BANK ROA

Independent Variable

Constant

(Pool)

0.02193
(11.8043)

Margin

0.019988
(5.5631)

Expn

-0.2281
(-7.9509)

Deriva

-0 .00024
(-0.9688)

D(1)

A
(GLS Fixed)

0.03174
(362.167)
0.06789
(15.1817)
-0.3493
(-130.803)
-4.72E-11
(-12.1348)

(GLS Random)

0.03399
(15.35789)
0.06573
(3.51962)
-0.387177
(-11.4467)
3.77E-12
(0.14741)

-0.01532
(-9.3986)

D(2)

-0.01143
(-7.6539)

D(3)

-0.00345
(-2 .5012)

D(4)

-0.000536
(-0.39198)

R2

0.2551

F -Statistic
N

37.4814
774

Durbin-Watson

1.714

0.998

0.6697

105797.9
465
1.4256

NOTE: t-s tatistics are shown in parentheses.

465
2.17278
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TABLE 13
INFLUENCE OF FIOBS ACTIVITIES ON BANK ROE

Independent Variable

(Pool)

Constant

0.274729
(5.98568)
1.36483
(2 .8272)
-4.39526
(-6 .11878)
-0.00037
(-1.0970)
0.07536
(5 .31847)
-0.580255
(-4.33751)
-0.11056
(-2.75634)
-0.09629
(-2 .6C020)
-0.01043
(-0.31411)
-0 .00356
(-0.00356)

Margin
Expn
Derive
Dep
Prem
D(1)
D(2)
D(3)
D(4)

R2
F-Statistic
N
Durbin-Watson

0.13792
13.5809
774
2.4087

E
(GLS Fixed)

(GLS Random)

0.4951
(39.6057)
0.7266
(6.4532)
-5 .5673
(-27.2066)
-4.99E-10
(0.4126)

0.5752
(12.4734)
0.83696
(2.1596)
-7.1520
(-10.1367)
2.17E-10
(0 .4063)

0.97244
4328.386
465
1.3223

NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses.

0.62665
465
2.561
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panel" models but tests significant at the 1 percent level and has a negative sign
in the "GLS" model. The inconsistency of these results indicates that the impact
of financial derivatives upon the return on assets is uncertain.
The dummy variables are statistically significant for 1990, 1991, and
1992 and are inversely related to ROA. The dummy variable for 1993 is
statistically insignificant while the constant term represents 1994 and is
statistically significant and positively related.
The explanatory power of the model ranges from .2551 to .998. This
suggests that, depending on the regression model selected, 25.51 to 99.8 percent
of the variation in ROA is explained by the state or independent variables.
The range of the reported Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) is 1.4256 to
2.1727. The "pool" and the "GLS random" results reported a DW of 1.714 and
2.1727, respectively, suggesting that there is no positive or negative
autocorrelation. The "GLS fixed" results indicate a DW of 1.4256, which is less
than the DW lower bound critical value of 1.578, reflecting that positive serial
correlation exists.
Table 13 reports the regression results for ROE. The same econometric
methodology was used to evaluate the impact of financial innovation on the
profitability of U.S banks relative to shareholder's equity or capital.
The variable MARGIN is shown to be significant statistically for all
regression results at the 1 to 5 percent level. This suggests a strong relationship
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between bank lending spreads and ROE . According to Berger (1995), one can
sometimes expect the traditional statistical relationship between bank lending
margins and earnings to weaken. Between 1990 and 1994, the dividend payout
ratios of U.S. banks declined, suggesting that bank managers tend to retain
increasing amounts of marginal changes in earnings rather than distribute
them to shareholders, adjusting the true rate of change of ROE, as compared to
ROA, and possibly accounting for the weaker statistical relationship .
The variable EXPN is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for all
three regression results. This confirms the results from table 12 that the cost
of the underlying operating structure is inversely related to the selected
profitability measures. This suggests that the more successful bank managers
are concerned with reducing the unit cost of transactions to induce a positive
marginal change in profitability.
The DERIVE variable results are statistically insignificant for all
regression models. The results indicate that there is no statistical relationship
between ROE and the level of financial derivatives relative to shareholder
equity or capital. This suggests that the increase or decrease of ROE is
unrelated to changes in the usage of financial derivatives. Also, financial
innovations, like swaps, futures, options, and securitization, are not used by
bank managers to enhance profitability.
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The variable DEP was reported as part of the "Pool" regression model and
was statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results suggest that as
U .S . banks captured a larger share of its funding from third-party deposits,
ROE would increase. This indicates an increasing dependency of U.S. banks on
deposits, which is considered to be a cheaper but more volatile source of funding
due to the interest rate elasticity of depositors. Also, the increased dependency
on deposits creates an inevitable mismatch between assets and liabilities. The
duration of the liability structure is shortened, as banks increase third-party
deposits; unless banks match this process by shortening the duration of assets,
they increase their interest rate exposure.
The variable entitled PREM was also reported as part of the "pool" results
and was statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The inverse relationship
between ROE and PREM indicates that as the uninsured deposit or market
premium decreases, a bank's ROE will increase. The finding that uninsured
debt rates respond to bank risk is consistent with most, but not all, of the
market discipline literature in banking (Gilbert 1990; Berger, King, and O'Brien
1991).
The coefficient of determination for the three regression results ranged
from .1379 to .97244. This suggests that the explanatory power of th e three
models varies, though the independent variables may be similar or the same,
according to the functional form of the regression model.
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The DW for all three regression results ranges from 1.3223 to 2.561. The
"pool" and "GIS random" regression results were 2.4087 and 2.561 , respectively,
indicating that any evidence of serial correlation is uncertain and fails to reject
the null hypothesis. The "GIS fixed" results of 1.3223 fall below the DW critical
value of 1.579, indicating the existence of positive serial correlation at the 5
percent of confidence.

D. Impact of Financial Innovation on
the Variability of Bank Profitability
A second component of our analysis is to consider not only how the level
of financial innovation may influence the level of bank profitability but also its
risk. Financial institutions are as concerned with the volatility, as well as the
level of their earnings. Equation (17) depicts, in general form , the relationship
between the variability in U.S . banks earnings (Varn), the level of operating
risk (Orisk, Nontrad, Liquid, Lossrat) , and financial innovation (Swa, Futopt,
Secrat) . If financial innovation has an important risk management role, then
as earnings variability declines, financial innovation should proliferate among
banks.

VARn, = f(Orisk , Nontrad , Liquid , Lossrat , Futopt , Secrat)

(19)

where the signs of the key operating measures are

a varn > 0
a varn > 0 a varn > 0 a varn > 0
aOrisk
' aNontrad
' aLiquid
' aLossrat
'
and the following relationships hold for the financial innovation variables:
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2 Varn < 0 a Varn < O Varn < 0
aSwa
' aFutopt
' aSecrat
.
It has been asserted that financial innovations, like derivative
instruments, are utilized by depository institutions to hedge their exposure to
interest rate risk to extend the depth of their product offering. Deshmukh,
Greenbaum, and Kanatas (1983) argue that in the absence of appropriate
derivative hedges, interest rate uncertainty will increase as the volatility of
interest rates increases, causing banks to reduce their lending activities.
The specification of the basic model follows the work by Brewer, Jackson ,
and Moser (1996). The model attempts to capture both operating and financial
risks as they relate to the variance of the profitability measures.
The DERIVA variables are the same series used in section B. According
to findings by Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996), the usage of derivative
instruments by U.S. S&Ls was inversely related to the variability of ROE and
ROA.
The results of the regression equation are outlined in tables 14 and 15.
The results suggests that ORISK is statistically insignificant. This indicates
that the increased variance of operating exposure (launching new products,
excessive personnel, too many branches, poor technology, etc.) is not statistically
correlated with variance of VARROA.
The NONTRAD variable was statistically significant at the 1 percent
level for the "GLS fixed" and "GLS random" results, suggesting that as
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TABLE 14
INFLUENCE OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS ON THE VARIABfLJTY OF
BANK ROA

Independent Variables
Pool

Constant
Orisk
Nontrad
Lossrat

-3 .62E-05
(-0.8011)
4.79E-11
(1.0141)
1.04E-06
(0.33424)
0.03033
(15.5922)

Deriva
Swa
Futopt
Seer at
D(l)
D(2)
D(3)
D(4)
Rz
F -Statistic
N
Durbin-Watson

-6 .75E-05
(-1.9295)
2.81E-05
(.8570)
-0.0024
(-1.50 10)
8.74E-05
(1.5656)
-6.23E-05
(-1.0970)
-0 .000156
(-2. 77949)
-6 .05E-05
(-1.08701)
.2725
28.5938
774
2.2639

NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses.

VARRQA
(GLS Fixed) (GLS Random)

-4.00E-05
(-4.6014)
1.52E-07
(0.7844)
0.00468
(10.0969)
-0.006783
(9.11282)
-2.85E-13
(-2.20746)

.49119
88.575
465
1.3863

-0.000142
(-3.9014)
3.12E-07
(0.43367)
0.009755
(5.1234)
0.01436
(10.3075)
-3.12E-13
(0.46513)

.64923
465
2.5517
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TABLE 15
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS UPON THE V ARlAB!LlTY OF
B ANK ROE

Independent Variable

Constant
Orisk
Nontrad
Lossrat

Pool

0.01550
(0.24690)
-1.19E-07
(-1.7987)
-0.02193
(-4.9919)
21.78797
(8.0060)

Liquid
Swe
Futopte
Sece
D(1)
D(2)
D(3)
D(4)

R2
F -statistic
N
Durbin-Watson

VARRQE
(GLS Fixed) (GLS Random)

-0.02789
(-7.2725)
-2.23E--05
(-0.5547)
2.8276
(7 .806)

-0.287602
(-6 .06732)
-0.000113
(-0.12920 1)
13.1004
(6.12622)
19.7577
(12.13822)

0.03633
(2.8202)
-0.00477
(-1. 7696)
-0.000522
-0.06764
-1.74E- 10
(-1.5181)
(-1.8025)
(-0.22187)
-0.13246 -3068.566 -66 102.2 1
(-1.0 1941)
(-0.10726)
(-0.07685)
0.12229
(1.5659)
-0.05907
(-0.74532)
-0.10799
(-1.37356)
-0.06288
(-0.80706)
.1251
10.916
774
2.7221

NOTE: t-statistics are in parentheses.

.9247
874.716
450
1.486

.58415
465
2.854
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nontraditional assets increase, the variability of bank earnings will increase.
This suggests that while banks are attracted by wider spreads on nontraditional
loan assets, there is an increase in the bank's underlying risk.
The DERIVA variable tested significant at the 1 percent level as well,
indicating that as the usage of financial derivatives (interest rate swaps,
interest futures and options, and securitization) decreases, the variability of
bank ROA will increase and vice versa. This suggests that banks utilize
derivatives to mitigate risk.
The results for the variable LOSSRAT tested significant at the 1 percent
level, suggesting increased loan losses impose greater levels of risk for banks.
The results of the financial innovation variables all reflected the
appropriate signs on the coefficients but tested differently statistically. The
SWA and SECRAT variables were statistically significant at the 10 and 20
percent levels, while FUTOPT tested statistically insignificant. The inverse
economic relationship between all the financial innovation variables suggests
that derivative instruments do play an important role in the risk management
strategy of U.S. banks.
The dummy variables all tested statistically insignificant except for 1992,
D(3) , suggesting that forces other than time influenced the evolution of ROE.
The explanatory power of the two models ranged from .2859 to .6492. The
reported DW results range from 1.3863 to 2.5517. The DW for the "pool" results
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suggests that no autocorrelation exists. The DW for the "GLS random"
regression model falls into the uncertain region, while the DW for the "GLS
fixed" is less than the DW critical value 1.579, suggesting the presence of some
positive serial correlation.
The results in table 15 reflect the variability of ROE against a similar set
of independent variables.

However, the financial innovation variables

(DERIVE, FUTOPTE, and SECE) were transformed to be related to shareholder
equity instead of assets.
The results are similar to those reported on table 14 with a weaker
statistical relationship for some variables. The ORISK variable in the "GLS
fixed" regression model tested significant at the 1 percent level and insignificant
in the "pool" and "GLS random" models. This may suggest that the operating
structure of banks is more closely linked to the underlying capital base than the
asset base.
The NONTRAD variable tested significant at the 1 percent level in all
three regression models. However, the results reported in the "pool" results
were incorrectly signed. This could indicate that the increases of nontraditional
assets in a bank's portfolio increases the uncertainty of bank earnings relative
to both the assets and the capital base.
The LIQUID variable results were statistically significant at the 1
percent level for the "GLS fixed" model. This result indicates that banks may
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increase their holdings in liquid assets in the face of increased uncertainty in
earnings.
The financial innovation variables (SWE, FUTOPTE, and SECE) tested
differently across the two models. The SWE variable was significant at the 10
percent level of confidence. This concurs with the result for the SWA variable
in table 14, where the increase in the level of interest rate swap usage suggests
a decrease in the level of uncertainty for bank profitability.
The FUTOPTE variable tested significant at the 10 and 20 percent levels,
while the SECE variable tested insignificant statistically. This is consistent
with the findings of Blanco and Fawson (forthcoming), which suggest that banks
can improve their ROA by securitizing, because the absolute value of assets will
fall and cause a corresponding increase in the value of ROA. However, a bank's
ROE may vary little or remain unchanged, since the capital base is unaffected
and the overall profitability from securitization only increases by the net service
and origination fees, having a minimal overall impact.
The explanatory power of the model ranged from .1251 and .9247. The
high R 2 for the "GLS fixed" regression suggests that when the error term
accounts for both cross-sectional and time-series variation, the specified
independent variables will explain a larger portion of the variation in the
dependent variable. The implication for bank managers is that there are key
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operating variables and financial innovations that directly influence the bank's
risk level.
The DW ranges from 1.486 to 2.854. The DW of 2. 7221 and 2.854 for the
"pool" and "GLS fixed" falls in the region of uncertainty for testing for the
presence of autocorrelation, while the 1.486 result for the "GLS fixed" indicates
the presence of some positive serial correlation.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The growth of financial innovations has played an important role in
managing the risk of U.S. banks and made financial markets more efficient.
The utility of derivatives has increased over time as financial and nonfinancial
institutions have attempted to incorporate derivatives as part of their riskmanagement strategy.
Some companies with risk-seeking preferences utilized derivatives to
speculate on interest rates and incurred substantial losses following the Federal
Reserve Bank's unexpected increase in the discount rate in February 1994.
Table 16 summarizes the losses of some of the principal financial and
nonfinancial institutions in the U.S.
Though U.S. regulators imposed risk-based capital requirements, some
of the better-known banks in the U.S. incurred substantial losses that increased
the value of the FDIC subsidy to these banks, salvaging shareholder values and
depositor funds at the expense of taxpayers.
The microeconomic effects of financial innovation have been determined
to be a function of the underlying utility of specific institutions. A model of
derivative usage by U.S banks found that banking firms are on the whole riskaverse, while banks that are risk-seekers do so at the peril of shareholders by
trying to maximize the value of the FDIC subsidy.
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TABLE 16
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL DERfVATfVE L OSSES BY THE PRINCIPAL
FINANCIAL AND N ONFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(ALL FIGURES IN $U.S. MILLIONS)

Entity Name
Orange County government
Barings Brothers PLC
Student Loan Marketing Co.
Bank One of Columbus
Federal Home Loan Bank of New York
Eastman Kodak
Household International
PNC Bank
Proctor & Gamble
Gibson Greetings Card Co.
Total

Financial

Entity Type
Nonfinancial
1,700

1,000
639
446
242
220
207
203
157
___20.

2,312

2,304

Source: Hays 1996.
The postwar history, particularly since 1960, of financial innovation
demonstrates that many of the major OECD countries show a shift of household
assets towards financial instruments that hedge current (inflation, volatility of
interest rates, etc.) and future (retirement, sickness, etc.) risks. The growth in
new financial products provided new channels for savings that were historically
not component parts of the monetary aggregates. The movement of significant
funds into new asset classes caused the reliability of monetary aggregates, as
a tool to forecast money growth, to diminish over time.
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The evolution of the ratio ofM2 and M1 has been determined to be a good
predictor of the adoption of financial innovation economywide. The evolution
of the M2/M1 ratio can play an important role in determining money demand
and its fluctuations , and the importance of this role increases with the rate of
inflation (Arrau and De Gregorio 1993; Arrau et al. 1995; Melnick 1995; Siklos
1993).
The evolution of this ratio is shown in figure 8 for the United States, the
United Kingdom , and France. The slope of the trend line for each ratio
illustrates the domestic rate of adoption of financial innovation for each country
over time. The standard deviation of each country's ratio describes the potential
shift of the domestic level of financial innovation for any given reason. The
larger the standard deviation, the greater the level of uncertainty among
domestic households and firms concerning future financial innovation. The
individual country graphs are shown in appendix A These results are reported
in table 17.
The correlation matrix in table 18 indicates how related or "correlated"
any two country ratio variables may be. The signs of all the values are positive,
suggesting they all move in the same direction. For example, for every one unit
increase in the American financial innovation ratio (USFD. the British financial
innovation ratio (UKFD will increase by .636625 of one unit. This suggests that
over 63 percent of the financial innovations in the U.S. also exist in Britain .
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FlG . B. -Evolution of the financial innovation ratio (1961-94).

This contrasts the relationship between the French financial innovation ratio
(FRFI) and USFI and UKFI, which ranges from .467434 to .533915,
respectively. The weaker relationship could be indicative of a more heavily
regulated finan cial system in France, where financial innovations are slow to
evolve because of delays that regulators may impose.
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TABLE17
FINANCIAL RATTO RESULTS

Country

Slope

United States
United Kingdom
France

.02299
.007655
.012993

Measure
Standard
Deviation

Mean

1.0210
.50428
.46717

3.0248
2.429
1.8832

Source: International Financial Statistics 1964-1996.

TABLE 18
FINANCIAL INNOVATI ON RATI O C ORRELATTON MATRIX

FRFI

UKFI
USFI

FRFI

UKFI

USFI

1.00000
0.467434
0.533915

0.467434
1.00000
0.636625

0.533915
0.636625
1.00000

The period-to-period change in the financial innovation ratio depicts the
speed as well as the rate of adoption of financial innovation. The standard
deviation of each ratio explains the average increase or decrease in financial
innovation from period to period that households and firms must expect. In
other words, there may be bad or excessively risky innovation that not only
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causes the adopters of the innovation to lose money but transmits a signal to
others of the downside risk potential of the entire class of innovation . For
example, Proctor & Gamble and Gibson Greeting Cards participated in a risky
innovation, leveraged foreign exchange derivatives, which provides a
counterparty substantial upside and downside risk. After recording substantial
losses, the demand for foreign exchange derivatives declined significantly for all
investors.
Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of the first difference of the financial
innovation ratio for all three countries. The large spikes are related to a
domestic or international currency crisis or a change in the computation of the
monetary aggregatesa 5 The figure shows that the change in the financial
innovation ratio increased over time for all three countries. While the change
in the United Kingdom's ratio (CHUKI) dampened in the 1990s, the change in
the French ratio (CHFRFI) actually increased over the same period.
The change in the U.S. ratio (CHUSFI) suggests a boom or bust cycle
during the 1980s and 1990s. This idea has been advanced by Persons and
Warther (1996), who state that the adoption process is a stochastic rather than
a linear process.

35
1n 1983, the United S tates changed its ca lculation ofM2 to include money ma rket
fund s . In 1987 , t he United Kingdom and France cha nged the ca lculation of qu asi- money,
indirectly affecting domestic M2 in both coun tn es.
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FIG. 9.-Quarterly change in the financial innovation ratio.
The change in the financial innovation ratio provides policymakers a
unique challenge. The fluctuating value of M2 may no longer be a policy tool to
forecast money demand. Rather, there are other variables that central bankers
must view as indicators of the state of the liquidity preference of economic
agents.
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The current monetary aggregates provide information about the state of
mind of financial markets and the propensity of households to make reallocation
decisions. This should assist central bankers in fulfilling their second major
role of providing liquidity to the financial system by acting as the lender of last
resort.
The introduction of risk-based capital measures imposed a regulatory
discipline upon bank managers. This bounds the usage of financial derivatives
by U.S. banks to capital. However, a large portion of financial innovation is
introduced by U.S. nonbank financial institutions (investment banks, insurance
companies, fund managers, etc.), which escape traditional regulatory channels.
The welfare gains to society of relatively unregulated financial markets
have been significant over time. The rate of adoption and the propensity to
innovate will be dependent upon the level of domestic regulatory vigilance. A
higher level of regulatory supervision will translate into a lower rate of adoption
and smaller period-to-period changes of financial innovation among households
and firms.
The growing influence of financial innovation upon the financial system
and the macroeconomy forces regulators to consider alternatives to traditional
financial regulation. The traditional regulatory mechanisms have tended to be
more instrusive and have increased compliance costs substantially. In the
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United States, for example, the FDIC Improvement Act included several
micromanagement provisions that were costly to implement and monitor.
An alternative solution is to consider mechanisms that prevent problems

from spreading to other institutions. Specifically, measures such as collateral
requirements or pricing interbank credit exposures will limit excessive
risk-taking throughout the financial system. Also, imposing credit limitations
by individual borrowers will limit the concentration of excessive risk.
A second alternative solution is limiting or even eliminating the FDIC
subsidy for banking institutions. This would reduce the moral hazard problem
inherent in the government deposit insurance program. For banks that persist
in undertaking very complex financial transactions, their access to deposit
insurance would be limited, while banks that continue with traditional banking
activities would have unimpeded access to government deposit insurance
programs.
These measures would, in good part, eliminate the rationale of the
regulators towards some banks of being "too big to fail." Under the traditional
regulatory system, regulators have been very reluctant to close big banks for
fear of the ripple effects throughout the financial system.

Limiting the

interbank levels of risk and constraining the availability of the deposit
insurance subsidy isolate any liquidity or capital problems to a single
institution , preventing a systemwide panic.
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Undoubtedly, financial innovation has changed the face of domestic and
world finance, permanently prompting regulators to respond in new and
creative ways to handle the changing nature of the banking system.
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Appendix B
Summary ofGLS Fixed Effects Results (dummy variable results by bank) .
flankLR~l::[QSsioo Results

Bank of Boston
First Bank of Boston
Shawmut Bank
State Street Bank & Trust
U.S. Trust Co mpany
Fleet Bank
First Fidelity Bank
Mid Atlantic Bank
First American Bank of NY
Atlantic Bank of New York
C itibank
Bankers Trust
Bank Leumi-NY

lli2A

.I1Q.E

VARROA

Y.AJill.QE

0.03726
(8.4943)
0.04544
(I 1.527)
0.03407
(6. 1327)
0.03053
(5.9957)
0.03•199
(8.4502)
0.03506
(7.878 1)
0.029565
(7.7669)
0.03367
(8.183 1)
0.03134
(5 .8583)
0.03667
(7 .2256)
0.03654
(9.5488)
0.03655
(8.5665)
0.03709

0.70 19
(7.3524)
0. 71284
(8.351)
0.6529
(5.408)
0.6015
(5.436)
0.6233
(6.929)
0.6374
(6.5981)
0.6374
(6.598)
0.6215
(7. 1713)
0.5896
(5.077)
0.6820
(6.2 12)
0.6228
(7.494)
0.671 I
(5.906)
0.6592
(7.466)
0.6701
(7.416)
0.7169
(8.0363)
0.7813
(8.884)
0.6548
(7.2 21)
0.5607
(6.879)
0. 7427
(8. 154)
0.6•122
(7.434)
0.5889
(4 .959)
0.768
(7. 194)
0.8924
(5 407)

-0.000172
(-1.8233)
-2.22£-05
(-0.20875)
-0.000272
(-2.06427)
-0.000 191
(· 1.57424)
-0.000 199
(-2.05245)
-0.000216
(-2.08546)
-0.00016
(-1.75276)
-0.000284
(-2.90716)
-0.000191
(-1.4858)
-0.0001 1
(-0.85777)
-9. 16£-05
(-2.45697)
-0.000207
(-1.57543)
-0.000 168
(-1.79766)
-0.00021
(-2.0789)
-0.000131
(-1.36398)
-6.55£-05
(-0.68361)
-0.000246
(-2.3609)
-0 .00017
-1. 75065
-4 .81£-05
(-0.53146)
-8.54£-05
(-0.93824)
0.00018
(1.42573)
-0.00025
(-2.45346)
-0.00035
(-1.93 102)

-0.40945
(-3.52931)
-0.39407
(-3.0 1822)
-0.49255
(3.3890)
-0.65437
(-4 .38827)
-0.45523
(-3.82567)
-0.415
(-3.24558)
-0. 12359
(-0.80599)
-0.49091
(-4 .070 19)
-0.435 18
(-2 .76869)
-0.22564
(· 1.43989)
-0.22191
(· 1.89608)
-0.3422
(-2. 12922)
-0.2964
(-2 .58982)
-0.40569
(-3.23 19)
-0.27207
(-2 .31644)
-0.28406
(-2.4 17 I)
-0.40918
(-3. 19601)
-0.30249
(-2.53382)
-0.33017
(-2.97302)
-0.29306
(-2 .55182)
-0.28094
(-1.81825)
-0.43749
(-2 .95899)
-0.66233
(-2.90527)

(9 . 1~21)

Bank of New York
C hase Manhattan Bank
Che mical Bank
European American Bank
Israel Discount Bank
Manufacturers Hanover TC
Morgan Guaranty Bank
Nat West Bank of USA
Repub lic Nat. Bank
Chase Lincoln First Bank

0.03692
(8.86629)
0.040916
(9.9618)
0.044389
(10.956)
0.03640
(8.7229)
0.03089
(8.2028)
0.044565
(10.6302)
0.03575
(9.0899)
0.28539
(5.20733)
0.04 11 01
(8.8689)
0.0445 I
(5.840 I)
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Summary (cont'd)
Aank/Rei::r~~sion

Results

MBNA America Bank
Co restates
Provident Nat. Bank
Hamilton Bank
Meridan Bank
Centra l TC
Fifth Third Bank
Ameritrust
Society Nat. Bank
Bancohio
Bank One of Columbus
Pittsbu rgh NaL. Bank
Mellon Bank
American Security Bank
Riggs National Bank
Fi rst Nat. Ba nk of Maryland
Signet Ba nk
First Union Nat. Bank
Wachovia Bank & Trust
South Carolin a Nat. Bank
Sov ran Bank
C restar Bank
South t ru st Bank of Alabama
NCNB National Bank

RQA

lill.E

VARROA

0.03906
(8.25788)
0.0366
(7 . 10952)
0.0399
(9.87707)
0.047136
(11.247)
0.02313
(4 . 1578)
0.039978
(5.25454)
0.026472
(3.84765)
0.03032
(7.2824)
0.03656
(7.674 11)
0.036617
(8.68542)
0.038965
(9.25330)
0.03331
(6.254 18)
0.032878
(6.02 174)
0.025694
(5.02296)
0.036513
(9.37352)
0.038573
(9.58764)
0.05328
(7.25848)
0.04548
( 10.45205)
0.04819
(11.15328)
0.042815
(9.8989)
0.041209
(8.76 196)
0 051803
( 11.464 17)
0.037 11 3
(8.42 16)
0.023807
(2.90962)

0.8924
(5.407)
0.7339
(7. 166)
0.67 10
(7.658)
0.7088
(7.783)
0.4688
(3.877)
0.7806
(4 .739)
0.4774
(3. 187)
0.5804
(6.419)
0.6004
(4 . 1004)
0.6363
(6.4232)
0.56352
(3.8016)
0.6274
(5.4336)
0.64 12
(5.4128)
0.4725
(4 .26853)
0.6573
(7.7813)
0.6384
(7.3027)
0.8 16 1
(8. 7854)
0.7649
(8.0927)
0.7738
(8.2037)
0.7306
(7. 7430)
0.7289
(7. 1215)
0.7905
(7 .800 I)
0.6645
(6.96105)
0.4307
(2.4262)

-0.00011 5
(-1.94649)
-0.00041
(-2. 73357)
-0.00026
(-2.09999)
-0.00022
(-1.93342)
-1.14E-05
(-0.08226)
-0 000385
(-2 .07207)
-0.00013
(-0.76858)
-0.0001
(-1.01688)
-0.00030
(-268509)
-0 00352
(3.40039)
-0.00025
(-2.29834)
-0.00019
(-1.52204)
-0.00025
(-1.94494)
-0.00026
(-1.95533)
-0.00018
(-1.82643)
-0.00036
(-2.68327)
-2 62E-05
(-0. 14478)
-0.00052
(-3.55839)
-0000177
(-1.52993)
-0.00016
(1.65367)
-0.000192
(-1. 70889)
-0.00029
(-1.92648)
-0.00017
(-1.47303)
-0.00096
(-4 .34959)

YA.JillQ.E

-0.37 121
(-2 .69553)
-0 .7 11 43
(-3.85 15)
-0.532 13
(-3.48676)
-0.5534 1
(-3.79160)
-0.58554
(-3.42988)
-0.79612
(-3.597 14)
-0.32 118
(-1.45385)
-0.27244
(-2.24228)
-0.592 19
(-2.6517)
-0.64768
(-4 .54304)
-0.453807
(-2 .0669)
-0.344688
(-2. 14661)
-0.42488
(-2.67009)
-0.48802
(-2.98269)
-0.328 155
(-2.69788)
-0.6342 1
(-3.8 1453)
-0.37545
(-3.0904)
-0.39649
(-3.3035)
-0.558 18
(-3.9 156)
-0.405 19
(-3.28509)
-0.36596
(-2.65 13)
·0.89006
(-4 .57623)
-0.38 108
(-2 .6347)
-1.4842 1
(-8.2073)
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Su mmary (cont'd)
Dankl.RQi:[QS~iQn Results

Capital Bank
S un Bank
Southeast Bank
Bank South
First NB of Atlanta
First American Bank of GA
Hibe rnia National Bank
Vihitn ey Bank
Deposit G uaranty Bank
First American Nat. Bank
Third Nat. Bank of Nashville
Lasa lle National Bank
Contine ntal Bank
First Nat. Bank of Chicago
Harris Trust & Bank
Northern TC
Merchants National Bank
Commercial Bank of Detroit
NBD Bank
O ld Kent Bank & TC
Citize ns Fide lity Bank & TC
First Ba nk of Louisville
Liberty National Bank
Mercantile Bank of St. Louis

ROA

llil.E

VARROA

VARROE

0.035868
(8. 1695)
0.05064
(7 .06955)
0.035868
(8. 1695)
0.04043
(8.93544)
0.032977
(6.43314)
0.03094
(4 .27006)
0.04329
(9.96065)
0.032953
(8.203)
0.036284
(8.36 150)
0.032565
(6.6 1846)
0.02994
(6.22345)
0.026822
(5.225)
0.04046
(5. 7476)
0.048823
(7 . 12340)
0.059678
(12. 7780)
0.04408
(9.8092)
0.052278
(9.45780)
0.047713
(8 .2099)
0.03608
(6.55494)
0.03389
(4 .8727)
0.033652
(4 .89833)
0.01496
(2 . 1122)
0.04439
(6.5864)
0.03824
(5.6479)

0.6022
(6.327)
0.9077
(5.8608)
0.72 17
(6.972)
0.6453
(6.544 2)
0.57889
(5.205)
0.6 11 8
(3.8938)
0.6266
(6.6503)
0.2998
(3.3604)
0.6176
(6.5685)
0.56346
(5.3011)
0.5066
(4 .8769)
0.5473
(3.7540)
0.77829
(2.8 115)
0.8Jl5
(5.4804)
1.03 147
(10. 16002)
0.75069
(7.7044)
0.9370 1
(7.8195)
0.80758
(6.3983)
0.60798
(5.3987)
0.5700 12
(3.795)
0.56906
(3.8366)
0.386927
(2 .5274)
0.70326
(4 .83559)
0.6 17333
(4 .22479)

-0.00015
(- 1.44 384)
-0.00012
(-0.66872)
-0.00026
(-2 .33646)
-8.45E-05
(-0.80626)
-2 .76E-05
(-0.21149)
-0.00022
(-1.20605)
4.76E-05
(0.44938)
0.00027
(2.7506 1)
-0.00015
(-1.48768)
-0.0001
(-0.82257)
-646E-05
(-0.50932)
-0.00027
(-1.88815)
-0.0004
(-2.65009)
0.000239
(1.35667)
0.00037
(349015)
-0.00012
(-l.l5448)
-9.88E-05
(-0.76061)
-0.00022
(-1.70141)
-0.00022
(-1.6869)
-0.00021
(1.16779)
-0.0031
(-1.75057)
-0.00046
(-2.75056)
0.00017
(0.9655)
-5.00E-05
(-0.28342)

-0.33004
(-2 .54729)
-0 .34952
(-1.5659)
-0.43872
(-2.9086)
-0.3361 3
(-2 .56377)
-0. 156 16
(-0.96501)
-0.47355
(-2 . 1028)
-0.32283
(-247 1 II)
-0.04738
(-0.36238)
-0.35054
(-2.7 1891)
-0.2 1768
(-1.3897)
-0. 15292
(-0.98411)
-0.540 17
(-2.35234)
-0.3879
(-2.0119)
-0.07759
(-0.35773)
-0. 10772
(-0.81485)
-0.33862
(-2.48385)
-0.448073
(-2.81392)
-0.67707
(-4 . 19293)
-0 .38432
(-2 .38311)
-0.34938
(-1.55652)
-0.51603
(-2 .2697)
-0.09044
(-04 1841)
-0. 11507
(-0.53 163)
-0.22491
(- 1.03896)
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Summary (co nt'd)
Bank/R~r::rQSSJQn Results

.!.illA

JlQE_

Boatman's 13ank of St. Louis

0.03069
(6.393 1)
0.039 13
(7 .670 1)
0.03315
(6.7176)
0.03948
(7.9765)
0.030977
(6. 168 19)
0.03335 1
(4 .866 16)
0.035486
(5. 16388)
0.014758
(2.2321)
0.045952
(6.54997)
0.03603
(5. 19515)
0.03574
(5.2908)
0 029453
(4 .366 1)
0.04606
(6.7 178)
0.03948
(7.97653)
0.02897
(5. 168 19)
0.037655
(7 .3 166 1)
0.045303
(6.60 11 )
0.03629
(5.30004)
0.043089
(6.26668)
0.00483
(0.7353)
0.03206
(4 .60856)
0.03726
(4 .2928)

0.5 102
(4 .9 198)
0.67710
(6. 1376)
0.56499
(5.2987)
0.667 17
(6.2316)
0.5284
(4 .8692)
0.59 769
(4 .0376)
0.62784
(4 .2283)
0.27 139
(190459)
0.665178
(4 .50056)
0.65804
(4 .2977)
0.62829
(3.4915)
0.72984
(4 .930 1)
0.694 5
(6.2402)
0.66074
(4.4549)
0.69655
(4 .6926)
0.69655
(4 .6926)
0.8236 17
(5.43217)
0.64065
(4 .3492)
0.500 1
(3.3156)
0. 102535
(0.68028)
0.58889
(3.9 146)
0.05909
(2 623 19)

Pirst Te nn essee Bank
Union Pla nters
No nv est 13ank of Mn.
Pirst Inte rstate Bank
United Bank of De nver
Co m. Bank of Kansas City
13a nk of Oklaho ma
Pirst C ity Texas Bank
I mpcrial Bank
Secu ri ty Paci[ic Bank
Bank of America
Ban k of California
Union Bank
Sumitomo Bank
Wells Fargo Bank
Bank of Hawaii
First Hawaiian Bank
Uni ted States Nat. Ba nk
Seattle First Nat. Bank
Pirs t S ec urity Bank of Utah
Zions First Bank

VARROA

VARROE

-9.06E-05
(-0. 70527)
-0.000 14
(-l.l246)
-9.64E-05
(-076738)
-0.0001
(-0. 77457)
-0.00025
(- 1.97147)
-0.00037
(- 194439)
-0 00034
(-1.8081)
-9.33E-05
(-0.42807)
-0.00016
(-0.86972)
-0.00021
(-1.13799)
-9.70E-05
(-1.54251)
-0.00021
(-2.22466)
- 156E-05
(-0.08689)
-0.000276
(- 184556)
-0.000205
(- 15 1282)
-0.00016
(-1.86972)
-0.000 12
(-0.7 11 28)
-7.95E-05
(-0.445 18)
-0.00023
(-2.0129)
-0.000 18
(-2.03 707)
-0.0001 19
(-1.6769)
-0.000221
(- 1.9907)

-0.23686
(- 15030)
-0 .32317
(-2.06 17)
-0.206 11
(- 1 33852)
-0.332 11
(-2 .01509)
-0.42733
(-2.69502)
-0.599 19
(-2.54878)
-0.56443
(-2.40006)
-0.32452
(-12 144)
-0.2852)
(- 12852)
-0.38048
(- 1 6268)
-0.23428
(- 107021)
-0.37307
(· 169882)
-0.3 1675
(- 14 359 1)
-0.38687
(-1.15674)
-0.43298
(- 1.2378)
-042987
(- 175649)
-045324
(- 10145)
-0.096
(-0.4758)
-0 .32 189
(-2 .3 145)
-0.3425 1
(-2. 1546)
-0.34256
(· 1 54367)
-0.34526
(- 169005)

